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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 29, Winter 1991, Number 2
Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the U.C.C.
Stephen G. York
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to say that the doing of something has been
made impracticable? Recourse to a dictionary is of no help in an-
swering this question.' Intuitively, this concept would seem to de-
note a course of action which, although not being impossible, is
difficult to actualize. But-even with this enlightenment one is left
with a rather vague idea of what this word implies.
The above question is addressed in this essay. This essay will be
concerned with the impracticability doctrine as it is codified in sec-
tion 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code").' Specifi-
cally, subsection (a) of this section will be analyzed.8
The mode of this essay is the critical analysis of current law, a
proposed remedy and justifications for this remedy. First, the essay
will explore the judicial interpretation and application of the im-
1. The dictionary posits that impracticability means "not practicable [or) incapable
of being performed or accomplished by the means employed or at command." Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary 577 (Merriam-Webster Inc., 1974). The latter definition is sy-
nonymous with the meaning of "impossible." Yet, common intuition would indicate that
impracticable means something different from impossible.
Further, since "practicable" is defined as "feasible," id at 902, impracticable means "not
feasible." The question then becomes "What does feasible mean?" The same dictionary tells
its readers that "not feasible" means something akin to impossible. Id at 419 (not "capable
of being done or carried out"). But, again, this seems intuitively wrong.
2. UCC § 2-615 (1987).
3. Subsection (a) of section 2-615 provides in part:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a breach of
his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impractica-
ble by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made.
Id at section 2-615(a).
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practicability doctrine." The test that the courts have developed
will be criticized as both unrealistic and lacking a proper founda-
tion in the intent of the drafters.6 Next, in light of this intent, the
purpose of section 2-615(a) will be discovered' and a new statute
will be proposed which will better effectuate this purpose. The
new statute will be shown to be in congruence with the commercial
philosophy of Karl Llewellyn, the principle drafter of section 2-
615.1 Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that most contracts
sought to be brought within the impracticability doctrine are "rela-
tional" in nature,' and that the new statute promotes the norms
associated with this type of agreement. 10 In addition, it will be ar-
gued that application of the new statute is fair, and that the stat-
ute tends to create certainty with respect to transactional plan-
ning.1" Finally, it will be shown that the new statute is efficient.12
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CASE LAW
There is an identifiable procedure courts will utilize when ana-
lyzing a case under the impracticability doctrine. Courts will an-
swer one or two questions in determining if the defense of imprac-
ticability exists. A court faced with this issue will first consider
whether the disruptive event, that is, the event which has allegedly
made performance impracticable, was reasonably foreseeable by
the parties at the time of contracting. If the event is deemed to
have been foreseeable, then this "fact" is dispositive, thereby fore-
closing discharge. However, if the court believes that the disruptive
event was not reasonably foreseeable, then the impracticability de-
fense may be established - depending. In this latter situation, the
court will query whether the occurrence of the disruptive event
made performance impossible. If performance has not been made
impossible, then the defense has not been established and the
promisor's contractual obligations will not be discharged. Thus, the
impracticability defense will be established if, and only if, the dis-
ruptive event was not reasonably foreseeable and if the event made
4. See notes 13 to 32 and accompanying text.
5. See notes 33 to 102 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 103 to 163 and accompanying text.
7. See notes 164 to 178 and accompanying text.
8. See notes 179 to 187 and accompanying text
9. See notes 188 to 242 and accompanying text.
10. See notes 243 to 250 and accompanying text.
11. See notes 251 to 255 and accompanying text.




THE JUDIcIAL Two-PRONG INQUIRY
The excuse of impracticability in contracts for the sale of goods
is codified in section 2-615 of the UCC. Subsection (a) of this sec-
tion delineates the requirements necessary to establish this excuse.
With but little variation, courts have interpreted this section as
requiring two conditions which must be met before performance is
excused. "First, the performance must have become 'impractica-
ble.' Second, the impracticability must have been caused 'by the
occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a ba-
sic assumption on which the contract was made.' "" If these two
conditions are met, then performance will be discharged pursuant
to the impracticability doctrine.
The condition that the disruptive event be one that the parties
assumed would not occur is (or is not) established by reference to a
foreseeability test.14 To provide a basis for excuse the disruptive
event must not have been foreseeable. This requirement deter--
mines which party assumed the risk of the occurrence of the dis-
ruptive event. As one court noted, "certain risks are so unusual
. ..that they must have been beyond the scope of the assignment
of risks inherent in the contract. . . ."' Thus, if the occurrence of
the disruptive event was not reasonably foreseeable, then the
promisor cannot be deemed to have assumed the risk associated
13. Mishara Construction Co. Inc. v Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass 122,
127, 310 NE2d 363, 366 (1974). Accord Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v Atlas, Corp., 467
F Supp 129, 134 (N D Iowa 1978) (court requires these two conditions and adds the condi-
tion that the promisor must not have assumed the risk of the disruptive event); Barbarossa
& Sons, Inc. v Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 NW2d 655, 658 (Minn 1978) (court requires these
two conditions and adds the condition that seller must seasonably notify buyer that per-
formance has been made impracticable); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
508 F2d 283, 293 (7th Cir 1974) (court requires these two conditions and adds that the
contingency must occur).
14. Mishara, 310 NE2d at 367 (the court states, with respect to this requirement,
that "[tihe question is ...was the contingency which developed one which the parties
could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility which could affect per-
formance?"); Northern Illinois Gas Co. v Energy Cooperative, Inc., 122 II1 App 3d 940, 954,
461 NE2d 1049, 1060, 38 UCC Rpt Serv 1222, 1232 (1984) ("The question of whether the
nonoccurrence of an event was a basic contract assumption is a question of foreseeability.");
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v Allegheny Ludium Industries, Inc., 517 F Supp 1319, 1323
(E D LA 1981) ("The rule has also been stated as 'excus[ing] delay or nondelivery when the
agreed upon performance has been rendered 'commercially impracticable' by an unforeseen
supervening event ... ' (quoting Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532
F2d 957, 988 (5th Cir 1976)).
15. Mishara. 310 NE2d at 367.
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with the occurrence of the event." On the other hand, if the dis-
ruptive event was foreseeable, and the promisor failed to protect
himself by means of an express provision in the contract, then the
risk of the disruptive event will be deemed to have been assumed
by the promisor.17 That is, "if a contingency is foreseeable, the sec-
tion 2-615 defense is unavailable. . . ."18 This is because the
"promisor can protect himself against foreseeable events by means
of an express provision in the agreement."" The failure of the
promisor to contractually insulate himself from a foreseeable event
is an implicit assumption of that risk.
Further, "[t]he foreseeability requirement does not entail con-
templation of a specific contingency; rather, it is sufficient that the
contingency that eventually occurred could have been foreseen as a
real possibility that would affect performance."' 0 This means that
the relevant judicial inquiry is not whether the parties actually
foresaw a certain contingency, but rather whether they could have
foreseen the event as a possibility. Thus, the foreseeability require-
ment is an objective standard.
In addition, courts tend to investigate the foreseeability require-
ment before considering whether performance has been made im-
practicable by the occurrence of the disruptive event. This is be-
cause the latter question need only be addressed if the disruptive
event is deemed unforeseeable. As one court posited, "[w]here the
occurrences complained of are in some degree foreseeable . .. it
becomes unnecessary to reach the question of how much increase
constitutes impracticability."' 1 Therefore, a positive answer to the
foreseeability question is dispositive.
If the disruptive event is deemed to have been foreseeable, then
contractual obligations will not be discharged pursuant to the im-
practicability doctrine. Many cases support this conclusion. In
Harper & Associates v Printers, Inc.," a defendent-printer agreed
to supply the plaintiff-seller with high quality fine art posters.
16. Waldinger Corp. v CRS Group Engineers, Inc., 775 F2d 781, 786 (7th Cir 1985).
17. Waldinger, 775 F2d at 786.
18. Id.
19. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F2d 957, 992 (5th Cir
1976).
20. Bende And Sons, Inc. v Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F Supp 1018, 1022 (E D NY
1982); United States v Wegematic Corp., 360 F2d 674 (2nd Cir 1966) (defendant electronics
manufacturer ought to have foreseen that possible engineering difficulties would be encoun-
tered in developing a new computer system).
21. Iowa Electric, 467 F Supp at 135.
22. 46 Wash App 417, 730 P2d 733 (1986).
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Thereafter, the defendant supplied the plaintiff with two printings
of the poster, but these were timely rejected by the plaintiff for
poor craftsmanship. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for breach of contract.
The defendant alleged that performance had been made imprac-
ticable because of difficulties in attaching a required foil overlay to
the poster. Yet, the Harper court noted that "[t]his potential prob-
lem was known and was discussed prior to the contract being
made. '23 That is, this "potential" contingency was foreseeable.
Consequently, the defendant's duty was not discharged.
Selland Pontiac - GMC, Inc. v King,'4 is a case where the dis-
ruptive event was not foreseeable. In this case the defendant was
to supply the plaintiff with four school bus bodies. Subsequently,
Superior, the company who was to manufacture and supply the
bodies to the defendant, went bankrupt. As a result, the bodies
were never manufactured and the defendant could not fulfill its
obligations under the contract. The plaintiff sued the defendant
for breach of contract.
The Selland court held, inter alia, that the defendant did not
breach the contract because performance had been made impracti-
cable by the manufacturer going out of business. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that "both parties testified that
they had no knowledge of Superior's questionable financial circum-
stances when they contracted.. . That is, the possible bank-
ruptcy was not foreseeable by the parties at the time of
contracting.2
6
The substantive result in these two cases is not atypical. If the
disruptive event is deemed to have been foreseeable, performance
will not be excused under the impracticability doctrine. However,
if the disruptive event was unforeseeable at the time the parties
entered the contract, then the court will further investigate the
event alleged to have made performance impracticable.
At this point, a court will query whether performance has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of the disruptive event. Case
law indicates that a court will allow a discharge of performance
under the rubric of impracticability only if performance has been
23. Harper, 730 P2d at 735.
24. 384 NW2d 490 (Minn App 1986).
25. Selland, 384 NW2d at 493.
26. Arguably, a co-contractor's potential bankruptcy is always foreseeable. That is,
this contingency is a logical possibility. See notes 33 to 78 and accompanying text for criti-
cism of the judicial foreseeability prong.
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made impossible. In applying 2-615(a) one court has expressly
stated this rule: "A distinction is also drawn between impractica-
bility which is 'subjective' and 'objective'. This has been described
as the difference, respectively, between 'I cannot do it' and 'the
thing cannot be done. . . .' Only objective impracticability may
serve to relieve a party of his or her contractual obligation."' 7 Re-
ported decisions have generally substantiated this distinction.
Thus, the impracticability defense will only be established if per-
formance has been made impossible.
In Gaddard v Ishawajma - Harima Industries Co., Ltd.,"8 the
defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff with quantities of small
boats as the plaintiff would order. Nineteen days after the contract
was entered, the defendant's factory where the boats were manu-
factured was completely destroyed by fire. In this case the court
excused the defendant's contractual performance pursuant to sec-
tion 2-615. That is, the destruction of the defendant's factory ex-
cused the defendant's performance.
Likewise, in Federal Pants, Inc. v Stocking," the defendant's
contractual performance was discharged pursuant to section 2-615
because that performance has been made impracticable. In this
case the defendant had obtained a right to buy sport shoes and
athletic apparel from the Nike Corporation. Only authorized deal-
ers could buy goods from Nike. The plaintiff was not authorized to
buy goods from Nike.
Subsequently, the plaintiff and defendant entered an agreement
whereby the plaintiff agreed to post a letter of credit which would
enable the defendant to purchase Nike products. In consideration
for the posting, the defendant agreed to resell the Nike products to
the plaintiff, or a person designated by the plaintiff. However,
when Nike discovered that the defendant was selling Nike prod-
ucts to unauthorized dealers, Nike terminated the contract it had
with the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for breach of contract stemming from the defendant's failure to
resell Nike settlement goods to the plaintiff.
The court ruled that the defendant had not breached its con-
tract with the plaintiff. After determining that Nike's termination
of the defendant's status as an authorized dealer was not foresee-
able, the court held that this event made the defendant's perform-
27. Sunflower Electric Cooperative, Inc. v Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan App 2d 131,
140, 638 P2d 963, 970 (1981) (citation omitted).
28. 29 AD 754, 287 NYS 754 (1986).
29. 762 F2d 561 (7th Cir 1985).
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ance impracticable. The defendant's obligation to supply Nike
goods to the plaintiff could not be performed since only authorized
dealers could buy Nike goods. That performance became impossi-
ble when Nike terminated the defendant's status as an authorized
dealer.
Waldinger Corp. v CRS Group Engineers, Inc.80 is an appropri-
ate case to illustrate the two-prong test thesis. In this case the de-
fense of impracticability was permitted. Therefore, according to
the proposed thesis, the court must have concluded (i) that the
disruptive event was not foreseeable at the time the parties en-
tered the contract and (ii) that the occurrence of the disruptive
event made performance impossible.
One of the two defendants in Waldinger was an engineering
company, Dietz, who prepared specifications for two waste water
treatment facilities. The plaintiff, Waldinger, was a mechanical
subcontractor who agreed to supply the mechanical portions for
the project. Ashbrook, the second defendant, was a company that
had contracted with the plaintiff to supply "sludge dewatering
equipment" for the project. The contract between Waldinger and
Ashbrook required that the equipment supplied by Ashbrook had
to meet with Dietz's approval. In addition, Ashbrook was contrac-
tually required to guarantee that the machinery supplied would
satisfy the project's performance specifications.
In preparing specifications for the project, Dietz had used a
"Carter" sludge dewatering machine as the model. This Carter ma-
chine had never been built before, but Dietz "took the Carter per-
formance claims at face value, making no independent study of
them."31 Further, Dietz required Ashbrook to literally comply with
the project specifications. Thus, the Ashbrook-supplied equipment
had to meet both the project's performance and mechanical speci-
fications. Although Ashbrook built a machine that could meet the
performance specifications, it was only the "Carter" machine that
could satisfy the mechanical specifications of the project. Conse-
quently, Ashbrook notified both Waldinger and Dietz that it could
not guarantee the performance of a machine built to the project's
mechanical specifications. Subsequently, Ashbrook informed Wald-
inger that it could not fulfill its contract because it could not sup-
ply a machine that met both the performance and mechanical
specifications of the project. Thereafter, Waldinger sued Ashbrook
30. 775 F2d 781 (7th Cir 1985) (cited in note 16).
31. Waldinger, 775 F2d at 784.
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for breach of contract.
The Waldinger court found that Ashbrook's contractual obliga-
tions were discharged pursuant to section 2-615(a). Initially, the
court considered whether the occurrence of the disruptive event
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting. The court
concluded that the disruptive event was not foreseeable. The dis-
ruptive event in this case was Dietz's requirement that Ashbrook
literally comply with the project specifications. In reasoning that
this event was not foreseeable, the court noted that "specific
mechanical subsystems were ordinarily waived by an owner's engi-
neer if a supplier could show that its equipment met performance
specifications ... "32 Also relevant to the foreseeability issue were
EPA regulations which required that specifications foster free and
open competition, and that specifications not be exclusionary.
Since Dietz's project specifications could only be satisfied by use of
the Carter machine, its insistence on literal compliance with these
specifications contravened these EPA regulations. Thus, the court
concluded that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Dietz would
violate EPA standards and not adhere to industry custom. The im-
plication of these facts is that it was not foreseeable that Dietz
would require strict adherence to the project specifications.
After disposing of the foreseeability issue, the court addressed
the question whether the occurrence of the disruptive event made
performance "impracticable." Because Ashbrook was contractually
required to guarantee performance of the machine it supplied,
which it could not do if it built the machine according to the pro-
ject's mechanical specifications, the court held that Ashbrook's
performance was made impracticable by Dietz's insistence on lit-
eral compliance with the project specifications. Thus, Ashbrook's
performance was made impossible by the occurrence of the disrup-
tive event. It was impossible for Ashbrook to guarantee perform-
ance and at the same time literally adhere to the project specifica-
tions. True, Ashbrook could have built a Carter machine, but since
such a machine had never been tested before, Ashbrook could not




CRITICISM OF THE TwO-PRONG IMPRACTICABILITY INQUITY UTILIZED
BY THE COURTS
Criticism of The Foreseeability Prong
The foreseeability prong of a tribunal's inquiry into the exis-
tence of impracticability is inadequate for several reasons. First,
the text of section 2-615 does not expressly refer to a foreseeabil-
ity-based test which must be satisfied in order to establish the de-
fense.8 This fact appears to indicate that the foreseeability test
was never intended to be determinative. One would expect that if
foreseeability was intended to be conclusive, then some express
mention of this test would be drafted into the statute. Yet, the
word "foresee" (or any of its variations) does not appear in the
text of section 2-615.34
If the foreseeability test is not explicitly stated in the statute,
then from where do courts derive this standard? The answer to
this question is that courts derived this test from the official com-
ments to section 2-615. A requirement of this statute is that there
occur "a contingency the non-occurence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made... . In explanation,
Official Comment 1 states that these are "unforeseen supervening
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting."5 The concept of an "unforeseen contin-
gency" is also mentioned in Comment 4, which states that the im-
practicability must result from "some unforeseen contingency
which alters the essential nature of the performance.
'3 1
The courts have given these two comments an unusual interpre-
tation. The comments require that the disruptive event be "un-
foreseen." Courts, however, have required that the event be "un-
foreseeable."" The point is that "unforeseen" and "unforeseeable"
are two different words. "Unforeseen" means that which is not or
should not be expected; that which is not reasonably possible.8 ' In
33. Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability In Contracts, 61 St John's L Rev
225, 236 (1987).
34. Norman R. Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic
Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Ind L Rev 457, 485 (1986).
"[N]o variation of the word 'foresee' ever appears [in section 2-615]." Id.
35. UCC § 2-615(a).
36. Id, Official Comment 1 (emphasis added).
37. Id, Official Comment 4 (emphasis added).
38. See notes 14 to 26 and accompanying text. The negative implication of this re-
quirement is that the defense is not available if the disruptive event was "foreseeable."
39. Mary Sue Bloomfield, The Role of Foreseeability in Allocation of Risk Under
UCC 2-615, Excuse By Failure of Presupposed Conditions, 21 S Tex L J 441, 446 (1980).
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contrast, "[u]nforeseeable . . . is defined much more restrictively
and means 'incapable of being foreseen, foretold or antici-
pated.'"40 Consequently, in this respect, the courts have inter-
preted these two comments in an overly restrictive manner. 1
The implication of this discovery is that the impracticability de-
fense will be established less often then the comments seem to in-
fer. This is because a contingency may be unexpected, that is un-
foreseen, and at the same time be a logical possibility, that is
foreseeable. For example, in Bende & Sons, Inc. v Crown Recrea-
tion, Inc., 4 a defendent-seller alleged that a train derailment made
impracticable the defendant's performance, i.e., the delivery of
combat boots to the Government of Ghana. The court held that
the defendant had not established the defense because "the derail-
ment was not unforeseeable."" In this respect the Bende court
said, "Although it did not appear that Bende[, the plaintiff,] and
Kiffe[, the defendant,] ever contemplated a train derailment...
common sense dictates that they could easily have foreseen such
an occurrence."" Thus, the court recognized that the parties did
not expect a train derailment to occur. This event was unforeseen
by the parties. However, since the train derailment was a logical
possibility, the court deemed that event to be foreseeable. The
point is that the comments and the court's interpretation of sec-
tion 2-615(a) seem to diverge on whether the disruptive event must
be unforeseeable, or merely unforeseen, for relief to be granted.
The rational behind the foreseeability test frustrates, at least in
part, a purpose behind section 2-615. As indicated above, some
courts have reasoned that a disadvantaged party's failure to con-
tractually insulate himself from the occurrence of a foreseeable
contingency is ipso facto an assumption of that risk.'5 According to
this rational, the only way a promisor can have protection against
40. Bloomfield, 21 S Tex L J at 447 (cited in note 39) (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language 2496 (1971) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)); Walter, 61 St John's L Rev at 236-37 (cited in note 33). "Contingencies that are
unforeseen refer to actualities, that is, did the parties actually foresee the particular contin-
gency at the time of contract, whereas the foreseeable events standard assumes a more ob-
jective test." Id.
41. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 4S7 (cited in note 34). The author comments that the
only references in Comments 1 and 4 are to the word "unforeseen," which is considerably
narrower in scope than "unforeseeable." The word "unforeseeable" appears nowhere in the
text or comments.
42. 548 F Supp 1018 (1982).
43. Bende, 548 F Supp at 1022.
44. Id.
45. See notes 14 to 19 and accompanying text.
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foreseeable contingencies is to describe generally those contingen-
cies whose occurrence will discharge contractual performance. Yet,
as one commentator points out, "[t]hat could not have been the
drafter's intent because section 2-615, by its terms, applies when
the contract is silent."" Therefore, to the extent the foreseeability
test is based on the "premise that a party can be expected to deal
in appropriate language with all situations he can foresee,"' 7 then
to that same extent is the foreseeability test at odds with the
proper operation of section 2-615.
Furthermore, the foreseeability test lacks a realistic foundation.
It is not a necessary inference that, because a party was silent in
the face of a foreseeable contingency, the party intended to assume
the risk that the contingency would occur. 4" There are a multitude
of reasons why the promisor remained silent. The promisor may
have believed that, although the disruptive event was foreseeable,
the likelihood of its occurrence was so remote as not to justify the
additional transactional costs required to provide for the event in
the contract. Alternatively, in this situation the promisor may have
wanted to avoid the additional strain on the relationship with the
promisee entailed in further contractual negotiations. There may
also not have been enough time at the negotiation stage to provide
for the contingency."9 Possibly, the parties omitted express refer-
ence to the allocation of a risk because they were unable to agree
as to which party would bear the risk."4 In any of these situations,
a failure to contractually provide for a foreseeable contingency is
not necessarily an indication that the parties intended that the
promisor bear the risk of the occurrence of the disruptive event.
Such an inference would be illogical."
46. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 487 (cited in note 34).
47. E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum L Rev 860,
885 (1968).
48. Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticabil-
ity: Searching for the "Wisdom of Solomon", 135 U Pa L Rev 1123, 1140 (1987); Thomas &.
Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual
Rights Under UCC Section 2-615, 54 NC L Rev 545, 567 (1976); Stephen J. Sirianni, The
Developing Law of Commercial Impracticability and Impossibility: Part I, 14 UCC L J 30,
63 (1981). Mr. Sirianni comments that "[iut is preposterous to expect business people to
focus on all contingencies -whether 'reasonably foreseeable' or not -that might render per-
formance impracticable." Id.
49. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J at 63 (cited in note 48).
50. Walter, 61 St John's L Rev at 235-36 (cited in note 33).
51. Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic 206 (MacMillan 1968). This is the Fallacy
of Affirming the Consequent. The argument "if P then Q, Q, therefore P" is an invalid
argument. Thus, if a party had intended to assume a risk, he may not have contractually
allocated that risk. But, mere contractual silence does not necessarily mean that the party
1991
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In addition, the foreseeability test has been criticized as being
ambiguous." The ambiguity in the application of the foreseeability
test is the product of the varying degrees of specificity with which
this inquiry may be posed. Suppose, for example, that a shipper
had contracted to transport wheat from the United States to
Iran." Let us further stipulate that after the parties had entered
the contract, the Suez Canal closed. This event drastically in-
creased the prospective cost of the shipper's performance. Thereaf-
ter, the shipper claims that his contractual performance has been
made impracticable by virtue of the Suez Canal closing. This essay
posits that a court, in considering the shipper's impracticability
defense, will initially investigate whether the occurrence of the dis-
ruptive event (i.e., the closing of the Suez Canal) was foreseeable
by the shipper (and charterer) at the time the parties entered the
contract.
The above fact situation confronted the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Transatlantic Financing Corporation v United
States." Since the shipper had assumed "abnormal risks," the
court concluded, he was not relieved of his contractual obligations.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Transatlantic court reasoned
"that the parties were aware that the Canal might become a dan-
gerous area.""6 That is, the court deemed the disruptive event to
have been foreseeable.
But what aspect of the disruptive event will a court consider in
determining foreseeability? Did the court query whether the ship-
per foresaw Israel's invasion of Egypt, and Britain and France's
invasion of the Suez Canal Zone?" In order to foreclose relief, did
the shipper have to foresee that in response to these acts the Egyp-
tian Government "would obstruct the Suez Canal with sunken ves-
sels and close it to traffic"?" Or, is it sufficient to foreclose dis-
charge that the shipper was aware at the time of contracting that
the Egyptian Government "nationalized the Suez Canal Com-
pany,"" and that this had created an international crisis?" Given
intended to assume an undisclosed risk.
52. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J at 58 (cited in note 48).
53. These facts are taken from Transatlantica Financing Corp. v United States, 363
F2d 312 (2nd Cir 1966).
54. 363 F2d 312 (2nd Cir 1966).
55. Transatlantic, 363 F2d at 319.
56. Id at 314.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Similarly, to foreclose discharge must the shipper have foreseen the disruptive
Vol. 29:221
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the same fact situation, a court may conclude that the shipper did
not foresee the specific cause of the disruptive event; but, nonethe-
less, the shipper could have anticipated the occurrence of this kind
of event. ° Therein lies the ambiguity. "A situation may be foresee-
able generally but not specifically." '
This discovery is important. "Whether a contingency will be
deemed 'foreseeable' will turn on how many questions similar to
those put above are addressed by the court."" The specificity of
these questions may be conclusive as to the existence of the de-
fense. If a court conducts the foreseeability inquiry by means of
specific questions, then there is a greater probability that the oc-
currence of the disruptive event will be considered to have been
unforeseeable at the time of contracting. On the other hand, "[tihe
more superficial the inquiry, the more likely it is that the contin-
gency will be deemed 'foreseeable.' ","3 Thus, given any fact situa-
tion, a disruptive event may be deemed foreseeable or unforesee-
able depending on what aspect of the disruptive event the court
examines in determining foreseeability.
Case law indicates that the relative specificity of the foreseeabil-
ity inquiry is within the "discretion" of the court. Consider, for
example, Eastern Airline, Inc. v Gulf Oil Corp.," where the plain-
tiff and defendant had entered a requirement contract for aviation
fuel. Subsequently, the defendant claimed that his performance
had been made impracticable because of the Middle Eastern oil
embargo and government price control. Disagreeing with the de-
fendant, the court held, among other things, that the disruptive
event was foreseeable. The court reasoned that "[tihe record [was]
replete with evidence as to the volatility of the Middle Eastern sit-
uation . . . [and] that oil [had] been used as a political weapon
with increasing success by the oil producing nations for many
event's actual impact on the contract, or is it sufficient that the shipper was cognizant of the
fact that if the disruptive event occurred, the cost of performance would increase?
60. Or, the shipper could not have foreseen that the disruptive event would have a
specific effect on the contract; but, the shipper was aware that a disruptive event of a cer-
tain nature would lead to increased cost of performance.
61. Farnsworth, 68 Colum L Rev at 886, n.130 (cited in note 47).
62. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J at 59 (cited in note 48).
63. Id at 59.
64. "Discretion" is used in the weak sense. In this sense the word simply entails "that
for some reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but
demand the use of judgment." Ronald W. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31 (Harvard,
1977). Discretion used in this sense, however, is not tantamount to license.
65. 415 F Supp 429 (S D Fla 1975).
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years.""" In addition, the court noted that, although the specific
government price regulation could not be envisioned ex ante, con-
tinual and changing government regulation was foreseeable since
government regulation of oil had taken place before the contract
was entered. Thus, in Eastern, the court focused on the general
aspects of the disruptive event in determining foreseeability.
It is interesting to compare the court's foreseeability investiga-
tion in Eastern with the court's analysis in Aluminum Company of
America v Essex Group, Inc. 7 In ALCOA, the plaintiff had con-
tracted to convert stated amounts of alumina into aluminum for
the defendant. The contract contained indexes to adjust the con-
tract price in proportion to the plaintiff's production costs. Unfor-
tunately, one index failed to accurately reflect the plaintiff's non-
labor costs when the i973 oil embargo and adherence to new pollu-
tion regulation drastically increased the plaintiff's cost of perform-
ance. The court held in this respect that "the parties could not
possibly have known of the sudden inability of the. . . price index
to reflect ALCOA's non-labor costs . .. [A] 500% variation of
costs to Index must be deemed to be unforeseeable, within any
meaningful sense of the word." 68 Unlike Eastern, the ALCOA
court focused on the specific effect the disruptive event had on the
performance of the contract in determining whether the disruptive
event was foreseeable.
The foreseeability test also suffers from the criticism that "hind-
sight is 20/20."'e6 "Events that have become part of history, espe-
cially if of major significance, have a way of seeming not just fore-
seeable but inevitable."70 This problem stems from the very real
possibility that a tribunal, in determining whether a disruptive
event was foreseeable, cannot totally disregard facts it knows con-
cerning the "postcontract world." Since the disruptive event has
already occurred, a court cannot view the event with only the in-
formation the parties possessed at the time of contracting. Conse-
quently, possibilities which seemed remote to the parties at the
time of contracting may appear to have been patently foreseeable
66. Eastern Airline, 415 F Supp at 441-42.
67. 499 F Supp 53 (W D Pa 1980) ("ALCOA").
68. Alcoa, 499 F Supp at 65.
69. Walter, 61 St John's L Rev at 239 (cited in note 33).
70. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J at 61 (cited in note 48). Hurst, 54 NC L Rev at 568 (cited in
note 48). Professor Hurst notes that "there is a danger that, once a contingency has oc-
curred, it will appear in retrospect to have been reasonably foreseeable although prior to its




One commentator has posited that an event can be deemed fore-
seeable when there is information available at contract formation
that would have allowed the promisor to anticipate the occurrence
of the disruptive event.71 This analysis appears to be the way
courts generally address the foreseeability prong. 2 If some amount
of information exists concerning the contingency at the time of
contracting, then the contingency will generally be deemed foresee-
able. For example, in Maple Farms, Inc. v City of Elmira School
District,75 the court found "that the contingency causing the in-
crease of the price of raw milk was not totally unexpected [be-
cause] any businessman should have been aware of the general in-
flation in this country during the previous years and the chance of
crop failures."' Yet, the problem with this analysis is that there is
almost never a lack of information concerning a future possibility.
In this sense, virtually all disruptive events are foreseeable. 7'
Indeed, there is usually too much information concerning future
possible states of affair.76 Take, for example, a prediction involving
the behavior of the stock market.77 There is probably data availa-
ble sufficient to support any prediction concerning the movement
of the market. Yet, even with this information "sophisticated in-
vestment analysts are wrong at least as often as they are right." 6
This implies that it is not a necessary inference that simply be-
cause information concerning the disruptive event was in existence
ex ante the event was reasonably foreseeable.
Criticism of the Impossibility Prong
The second prong of a court's impracticability analysis - that the
promisor's performance be made virtually impossible by the occur-
rence of the disruptive event - does not comport with the drafter's
intent of section 2-615. The principle drafter of Article 2 was Pro-
71. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J at 61-2 (cited in note 48).
72. Id at 59. The author says that "[ilt appears that a contingency will be deemed
foreseeable if there was any glimmer at the time the contract was made that any event
slightly resembling what actually occurred might have been possible." Id (footnote omitted).
73. 76 Misc 2d 1080, 352 NYS 2d 784 (1974).
74. Maple Farms, 352 NYS at 789.
75. Sirianni, 14 UCC L J 62 (cited in note 48).
76. Id at 61-2.
77. Id (author uses this example).
78. Id at 62. The author cites William A. Kent, The Smart Money - How to Invest in
the Stock Market Like an Insider 60 (1972) as authority for this proposition.
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fessor Karl Llewellyn .7  A proper interpretation of this section
must be consistent with Llewellyn's purpose in drafting section 2-
615.80 Where is this intent to be found? One commentator has sug-
gested that "[tlhe most obvious manifestation of Llewellyn's intent
appears in the... official comments to section 2-615. "81
One could argue that the official comments are of no authorita-
tive relevance inasmuch as they are not part of the text of any
statute. Furthermore, it could be argued that since the drafters
had deleted a provision of an earlier draft of the Code, which had
made express reference to the authority of the comments as an aid
in the interpretation of the text, then the comments ought not to
be consulted in ascertaining the intent of the drafters.82 But these
arguments are wrong. The official comments to Article 2 are signif-
icant for several reasons. First, Llewellyn himself recognized the
value of the comments. He said that "[a] commentary is thus an
integral part of. . . a Code.""8 Professor Llewellyn believed that a
"sound development" of the law could only be achieved if there
existed adequate commentary to guide a court's interpretation of
the relevant statute." Llewellyn's thoughts on this subject can be
found in other contexts. In a draft comment of section 1 of the
Revised Sales Act, he stated that "'[tihe comments are further
designed to state with clarity and precision the intent of each sec-
tion. . . ."'0 Likewise, in an appendix to the Uniform Revised
Sales Act, Third Draft, Llewellyn stated that "'[t]he Official Com-
ments . . . aim at straight exposition of purpose and effect of the
section and of its relation to prior law .... "'" This latter state-
ment is especially significant because the Uniform Revised Sales
79. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 459, n.4 (cited in note 34). Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Mod L Rev 167 (1964). The author states that "[t]he
Uniform Commercial Code.. . was drafted under the direction of the late Karl N. Llewel-
lyn." Id.
80. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 462 (cited in note 34). Professor Prance instructs his
readers that "[a]. .goal of statutory interpretation is that the interpretation be consistent
with the intent of the drafter." Prance cites C. Dallas Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory
Construction § 48.12 (1973), as authority for this proposition. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 462.
81. Id.
82. Robert H. Skilton, Some Thought on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 Wis L Rev 597, 599 (1966). "Section 1-102(3)(f) Of the 1952 code had declared:
'The Comments [of the Code] . . . may be consulted in the construction and application of
this Act .. " Id.
83. William L. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 527 (Univ of OK,
1985).
84. Twining, Llewellyn at 526 (cited in note 83).




Act was the embryonic version of Article 2.87 Thus, it appears that
the drafter of section 2-615 envisioned that the official comments
would play an important role in the section's interpretation.
More generally, the official comments were written by the people
who participated in the drafting of the Code or were associated
with those who did." The implication of this is that the comments
"may be viewed as part of the legislative history of the Code," 8
because the statute and accompanying comments stem from the
same source. The natural inference from this fact is that the same
purpose guided the drafting of both.
In addition, it is not insignificant that commentators have recog-
nized the importance of the comments. One commentator has ad-
vocated that "Itihe main function of the comments is as an aid to
interpretation.. . ."90 Another reasoned that "[a] thorough job of
construing the Code calls for using the comments to make sure one
has found the pertinent language of the statute, as a double-check
on a tentative construction, and as a secondary aid where the lan-
guage of the statute is ambiguous."'" One professor argued that the
comments "form a treatise on the Code, and may be consulted as
any other treatise, standing on its own merits.'92 Another professor
maintained that "the comments were intended by the drafter of
the Code to assist the courts in applying and interpreting commer-
cial law. . .".. 93 It is apparent, therefore, that many scholars have
imputed the comments with importance.
The courts' reaction to the commentary of the Code is of para-
mount interest, because the relevant "question is what courts will
do, rather than what they should do."' 4 Case law indicates that
courts are very receptive to the comments as an explanatory de-
vice. As one court put it, "[t]he purpose of the comments is to ex-
plain the provisions of the code itself, in an effort to promote uni-
formity of interpretation."5
87. Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
Col L Rev 798, 799-800 (1958).
88. Skilton, 1966 Wis L Rev at 602-03 (cited in note 82); Twining, Llewellyn at 329
(cited in note 83). Professor Twining argues that since the comments "bear the imprimatur
of the responsible for the code... they have strong claims to be authoritative." Id.
89. Skilton, 1966 Wis L Rev at 602 (cited in note 82).
90. Twining, Llewellyn at 329 (cited in note 83).
91. Horngold, Sales and Sales Financing 19 (2d ad 1962).
92. Skilton, 1966 Wis L Rev at 603 (cited in note 82).
93. John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking A Realistic Look at the Code, 29
Wm & Mary L Rev 341, 375 (1988).
94. Skilton, 1966 Wis L Rev at 598 (cited in note 82).
95. Burchett v Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 NM 575, 578, 396 P2d 186, 188
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Clearly, the comments are relevant to the proper interpretation
of section 2-615. It is just as clear that the comments "advance a
broad reading of the statute."" This can be garnered from the ex-
press language of the comments. The second sentence of Official
Comment 3 contrasts commercial impracticability "with 'impossi-
bility,' 'frustration of performance' or 'frustration of venture.' ,,97
Comment 6 can be read as to suggest that loss-splitting may be
appropriate."s Further, delay in performance as a consequence of
seeking adjustment of the contract in light of a contingency may
be excused."
Thus, the comments indicate that Llewellyn intended the Code
impracticability defense to be available in more situations than the
common law impossibility doctrine would allow.100 Unfortunately,
"[i]n spite of the intent of the draftsmen of section 2-615 to
achieve innovation and liberalization of the law, the judiciary...
[has] shut the door to further judicial interpretation and expan-
sion."10' This means that courts have treated "Code impracticabil-
ity [to be] very much like the common law doctrine of impossibil-
ity."' 02 Consequently, the courts' interpretation of section 2-615(a)
has not been true to the drafters' intent.
A NEW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2-615(A)
General Principles of Statutory Construction
Karl Llewellyn believed that a statute "must be read in light of
some assumed purpose."103 "A statute," Llewellyn advocates,
"merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is non-
(1964).
96. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 462 (cited in note 34).
97. UCC § 2-615 (1978), Official Comment 3.
98. Id, Official Comment 6. Note, however, Comment 6 does not expressly say that
loss-splitting is appropriate. The comment says that when neither "excuse" or "no excuse"
will serve the ends of justice, adjustment of the agreement based on equitable principles
may be appropriate.
99. Id, Official Comment 7.
100. Prance, 19 Ind L Rev at 463 (cited in note 34); Frederic K. Spies, Article 2:
Breach, Repudiation And Excuse, 30 Mo L Rev 225, 255 (1965). Spies says that "[t]he
examples given in the [comments to section 2-615] suggest that the conditions intended to
be covered must be something more prosaic, although the cases cited in [Llewellyn's notes]
suggest that Professor Llewellyn was seeking the widest possible application of this section."
Id.
101. Walter, 61 St John's L Rev at 259 (cited in note 33).
102. Id.
103. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
and Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395, 400 (1950).
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sense."10 Furthermore, "[i]f the statute is to be merged into a go-
ing system of law.., the court must do the merging, and must in
so doing take account of the policy of the statute ... ."16' Thus,
the purpose of a statute is the ingredient which makes a court's
interpretation of that statute sound.
This principle of statutory construction is expressly included
within the Code. Section 1-102 mandates that Code sections be ap-
plied in a way that effectuates their purpose and policies.'" Fur-
thermore, the comments to section 2-615 suggest that the "Section
. . . is to be interpreted in all cases sought to be brought within its
scope in terms of its underlying reason and purpose. 1 07 Appar-
ently, in order to interpret section 2-615(a) correctly, Llewellyn's
philosophy and the Code mandate that one comprehend the pur-
pose of this statute.
One Interpretation of Section 2-615(a)
Karl Llewellyn utilized a unique drafting technique in writing
Article 11.10 8 He believed that "'[e]very provision should show its
reason on its face. Every body of provisions should display on their
face their organizing principle.' "" The reason for this mode of
drafting was that "uniform interpretation by judges of different
schooling, learning and skill is tremendously furthered if the rea-
son which guides application is the same reason in all cases."'110
104. Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 400 (cited in note 103).
105. Id (emphasis added); Mentschikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 170 (cited in note 79).
Mentschikoff said "that proper construction [of a Code section) follows the reason and is
limited or extended by it." Id.
106. UCC § 1-102 (1987). In explanation, the official comments to this section require
that "Itlhe text of each section should be read in light of the purpose or policy of the rule or
principle in question.. .and the application of the language should be construed narrowly
or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes or policies involved." Id,
Official Comment 1.
107. UCC §2-615, Official Comment 2.
108. Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary I Rev at 371 (cited in note 93); see also, Mentchikoff, 27
Mod L Rev at 168, n.3 (cited in note 79). Professor Mentschikoff comments that "[d]espite
the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code, the extent to which it reflects
Llewellyn's philosophy of law and his sense of commercial wisdom and need is startling." Id.
109. Twining, Llewellyn at 321-22 (cited in note 83) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Pa-
pers at 5 (1944)); Mentschikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 170 (cited in note 79). Professor Ment-
schikoff, while discussing the Code drafting technique, said "[the attempt, therefore, has
been to draft rules so that both the situation being covered and its reason tend to appear on
the face of the language .. " Id.
110. Twining, Llewellyn at 322 (cited in note 83) (quoting Llewellyn, Papers at 5);
Mentschikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 170 (cited in note 79). Professor Mentschikoff said in re-
gards to this, that "[t]he most important drafting concept rests on the belief that relative
certainty and uniformity of construction depend on the court's perception of the situation
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This technique is called the principle of patent reason. "1 A re-
quirement of a statute drafted with a patent reason is that a
proper interpretation of it "must make some kind of sense in
terms of the reason."'" Furthermore, the official comments are rel-
evant to ascertaining the purpose of a Code section.113 Thus, the
purpose of section 2-615(a) may be found in the text and official
comments to this section.
In analyzing section 2-615(a), one is immediately struck with the
realization that this law is an "excuse" provision. The language of
the statute supports this proposition. For example, the title of this
section begins with the word "Excuse. 11 4 A title is commonly
thought of as a synopsis of what the titled entity covers. Thus, an
entity entitled "Excuse" would seem to involve that concept. Fur-
ther, the first official comment begins, "This section excuses
V.15 This makes plain that the statute involves a type of excuse
of performance.
The textual organization of 2-615(a) amplifies its nature as an
excuse provision. Excuse of performance is not a mere exception to
the statute with "no excuse" being the norm. There is an except
clause in 2-615(a) which delineates the situations where perform-
ance is not discharged.11 One would believe that exceptions to a
law are qualifications to the main concept of the statute. These
provisions merely indicate in what situations the main concept
does not apply. Consequently, the result obtained when an excep-
tion is applicable is contrary to the kind of end the main concept
of the statute sought to achieve. If the exception to the law is "no
excuse," then it follows logically that the main idea of the statute
represented by the rule and the reason the rule was adopted...." Id.
111. Twining, Llewelyn at 321 (cited in note 83). Commentators have differed as to
the scope of this principle. Some have gone as far as to claim that "Llewellyn consciously
included reason, purpose and policy in each section as part of the major drafting technique
in the Code." Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev at 372 (cited in note 93). However, other com-
mentators have found that "only sparing use was made of the device of incorporating spe-
cific statements of purpose in the [Code] rules themselves." Twining, Llewelyn at 323
(cited in note 83). For purposes of this essay it will be assumed that this latter technique
was used in drafting section 2-615(a).
112. Twining, Llewellyn at 322 (cited in note 83) (quoting Llewellyn, Papers at 5
(cited in note 109).
113. Twining, Llewellyn at 322 (cited in note 83).
114. UCC § 2-615 (1987). The title of section 2-615 is "Excuse by Failure of Presup-
posed Conditions".
115. Id, Official Comment 1 (emphasis added).
116. UCC § 2-615 (1987). Section 2-615 begins with the qualification, "Except so far as




is "to excuse."' 17 Thus, the dominant theme of section 2-615(a) is
to discharge performance.'"
In addition, the location of section 2-615 in Article II is revealing
as to its nature. This section is located in Part Six of Article II and
is entitled "Part 6 Breach Repudiation and Excuse."'" As the title
indicates, this part of the Code contains, among other things, sec-
tions dealing with excuses to performance. In fact, the last four
sections of Part Six are excuse provisions."20 Not too surprisingly,
section 2-615 is one of these latter sections. Consequently, this sec-
tion is primarily an excuse provision.
The official comments to section 2-615 bespeak the commercial
character of this statute. The comments indicate that the basic
policy of the statute is to use commercial impracticability as a test
for excusing contractual performance.'12  Official Comment 3 ex-
pressly tells its readers that the "test of commercial impracticabil-
ity.., has been adopted in order to call attention to the commer-
cial character of the criterion chosen by this Article."'2
Furthermore, the comments explain that this section ought to be
interpreted in light of commercial practices." 82 Evidently, commer-
cial understanding was meant to play a major role in the interpre-
tation and application of section 2-615(a).
Another Interpretation of Section 2-615(a)
Thus far, section 2-615 has been interpreted as an excuse provi-
117. Copi, Logic at 249 (cited in note 51). This is merely an expression of the logical
inference Modus Tollens.
If P then Q,
Q,
Therefore, P.
118. This end will be actualized unless (i) an exception applies or (ii) the conditions of
2-615(a) are not satisfied.
119. Uniform Commercial Code Art 2, Part 6 (1987) (emphasis added).
120. Part Six of Article II contains sixteen sections. The last four sections - UCC § 2-
613 "Casualty of Identified Goods," UCC § 2-614 "Substituted Performance," UCC § 2-615
"Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions," and UCC § 2-616 "Procedure on Notice
Claiming Excuse," deal with excusing contractual performance.
121. UCC § 2-615, Official Comments 1, 10. Comment 1 states that "[tIhis section[,
section 2-615,J excuses a seller. . . where his performance has become commercially imprac-
ticable." Comment 10 tells its readers that 2-615 "[flollowfs] its basic policy of using com-
mercial practicability as a test for excuse."
122. Id, Official Comment 3; see also, Official Comment 8 wherein the drafters wrote
"this section itself sets up the commercial standard for normal and reasonable
interpretation."
123. Id, Official Comment 8. The comment infers that "this section [is] to be read in
the light of mercantile sense and reason."
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sion which is commercial in character. This interpretation was de-
rived by use of the "Patent Reason Technique."' 4 But is this in-
terpretation correct? One way to demonstrate that the present
interpretation is correct is to show that a different interpretive
technique would yield the same or similar interpretation. "An al-
ternative technique to... statements of purpose 'consists in mak-
ing the purpose of a provision appear on its face by the choice of
language and by the organization of the thought in light of the sit-
uation." 1 6 In this manner, purpose is derived from the statute's
choice of words, textual organization and articulation of "situation-
sense.", 6
As section 2-615's choice of language and textual organization
have already been examined, 17 this essay will now only explore
Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense. Situation-sense is a difficult
concept to understand.12 8 According to Llewellyn, situation-sense
is an idea which entails the persuasiveness of certain facts in a spe-
cific context, and the subjective lens, fashioned by knowledge and
experience, with which a judge or court views these facts."' e In ex-
planation, Llewellyn quoted the German legal scholar, Hermann
Levin-Goldschmidt:
Every fact pattern of common life . . . carries with itself its appropriate,
natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which . . . rests on the
solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of
the life conditions of time and space: it is thus not eternal or changeless nor
everywhere the same, but is in-dwelling in the very circumstances of life.1
3 0
124. See notes 108 to 123 and accompanying text.
125. Twining, Llewellyn at 324 (cited in note 83) (quoting Llewellyn, Papers at 6
(cited in note 109). See also, Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 401 (cited in note 103). Professor
Llewellyn urged that, to make a specific canon of statutory construction apply to the statute
in question, "(tjhe good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available
language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of that language" must be argued. Id.
126. Twining, Llewellyn at 324 (cited in note 83). This essay assumes that there is a
close nexus between "situation-sense" and statutory interpretation. That is, situation sense
should be referred to in the interpretation of an Article 2 code provision.
127. See notes 114 to 120 and accompanying text.
128. Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv L Rev 678,
698 (1984): "Situation-sense is among the most confusing concepts created by Llewellyn."
Twining, Llewellyn at 217 (cited in note 83): "'Situation-sense' is made a key concept in
The Common Law Tradition; unfortunately it is one of the most obscure."
129. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition at 60 (1960). In defining this
concept, Llewellyn says, "Situation-sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts in
their context and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working result, coupled
with what ever the judge or court brings and adds to the evidence, in the way of knowledge
and experience and values to see with, and to judge with."
130. Twining, Llewellyn at 217 (cited in note 83) (quoting Llewellyn, Common Law at
122 (cited in note 129). Professor Feinman claims that "Llewellyn purports to translate from
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Goldschmidt coined this the "immanent law." Further, Llewellyn
believed that the task of a court was to discover and implement
this "immanent law. 1 3 1 In order to achieve this goal, a court must
"truly understand" and "rightly evaluate" the "facts of life." 132 In
so doing, a court should "fashion a rightly sound rule"' ss to apply
in the case at hand.
The meaning of these passages has received the attention of va-
rious scholars, and an examination of the literature apparently dis-
closes little harmony among the interpretive conclusions reached.
At first blush, the Levin-Goldschmidt passage seems to imply "a
species of natural law theory that is intuitionist and metaphysi-
cal."'" However, scholars have not tended to equate Llewellyn
with a natural law theorist.
35
Generally, there are three dominant interpretations of situation-
sense. One interpretation holds that the concept entails one of two
possible, mutually exclusive meanings. Situation-sense can mean
either that policy or principle which guides a court's decision-mak-
ing or judicial familiarity with commercial mores and practices.' 6
On the other hand, Professor Twining sees no reason why situa-
a 'preface' to Goldschmidt, Der Entwurf eines Handelsgesetzbuchs fur die Preussischen
Staaten (pt 2), 4 Kritische Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesammte Rechtswissenschaft 289 (1857),
but the nature and location of this preface are not apparent from the sources." Feinman, 97
Harvard L Rev at 699, n.93 (cited in note 128).
A more telling quotation appears in another of Llewellyn's writings, wherein he says:
case-law doctrine in Contract is built around the facts of adjudication, and is likely
both to reflect life-conditions and to stay moderately close to them. When in doubt
whether a given body of Contract doctrine is case-law doctrine, one very helpful ap-
proach is to examine the fact-conditions to which the doctrine purports to apply. If it
fits those conditions, it is likely to fit the cases, more or less roughly; if it does not, it
does not.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 Yale L J 779,
779-780 (1939).
131. Llewellyn, Common Law at 122 (cited in note 129): "'The highest task of Law-
giving consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law'" (quoting Levin-Gold-
schmidt, Der Entwurf at 289 (cited in note 130)).
132. Twining, Llewellyn at 217 (cited in note 83) (quoting Llewellyn, Common Law at
127 (cited in note 129): "Only as a judge or court knows the facts of life, only as they truly
understand those facts of life, only as they have it in them to rightly evaluate those facts
and to fashion a rightly sound rule and an apt remedy, can they lift the burden Goldschmidt
lays upon them; to uncover and to implement the immanent law." Id.
133. Id.
134. Twining, Llewellyn at 218 (cited in note 83).
135. Id at 219. "Llewellyn often criticized the idea that there should necessarily be a
single just solution or correct answer to every legal problem." Id.
136. Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary at 369-70 (cited in note 93); Patrick J. Rohan, The Com-
mon Law Tradition: Situation-sense, Subjectivism, or "Just-Result Jurisprudence'?, 32
Fordham L Rev 51, 56-60 (1963).
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tion-sense cannot encompass both these meanings at once.' In
this vein, situation-sense involves both the formulation of relevant
policies or principles and the appreciation of commercial mores
and practices. 3 8 The third dominant interpretation of this concept
posits that it entails solely the "law merchant," that is, the cus-
toms, usages and practices of the commercial agent.3 9 Of course,
there are other interpretations of situation-sense,'4 0 but these in-
terpretations do not appear to have attracted many followers.
Which interpretation most accurately reflects Llewellyn's ideas,
this paper proposes, is a moot question. The issue is moot because
the three dominant interpretations are compatible with one an-
other. They are compatible in that all the interpretations necessa-
rily involve recognition of commercial norms. Situation-sense,
when defined as the guiding principles or policies in judicial deci-
sion-making, necessarily entails a tribunal's familiarity with com-
mercial mores."' Llewellyn believed that the principles or policies
a court uses in deciding a commercial case ought to be based upon
commercial practices and mores."" He said that "policy and prin-
ciple must fit the facts, and must be rebuilt to fit changing
facts. 1 3 The apparent conflict between the various interpretations
137. Twining, Llewellyn at 222 (cited in note 83).
138. Id.
139. Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 Stan L Rev 621, 626 (1975); Professor Danzig comments that "Article II frequently
speaks as though courts should discover the law merchant from a careful, disinterested ex-
amination of custom and fact situations. . .[and] the intention of this Act is to use the
standards of current commerce." Id. See also, Chris Williams, The Search for Basis of Deci-
sion in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 Harv L Rev 1495, 1499 (1984). Professor
Williams says that situation-sense "meant an understanding of the usages and practices
common in the trade." Id.
140. See for example, Charles E. Clark and David M. Trubeck, The Creative Role of
the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in Common Law Tradition, 71 Yale L J 255 (1962).
"Clark and Trubeck assume that 'situation sense' must be each judge's personal intuitive
feel for the facts." Id. See also, Twining, Llewellyn at 217-18 (cited in note 83) (footnote
omitted); Harold D. Lasswell, The Common Law Tradition - Deciding Appeals, 61 Colum L
Rev 940 (1961). "Lasswell...seems to imply that 'situation sense' involves the ability to
classify correctly any fact-situation into a set of established categories." Twining, Llewellyn
at 233-34 (cited in note 83).
141. Professor Twining notes this point when he says "it would be artificial and mis-
leading to separate the formulation of policy from the classification of facts, because they
are to a large extent interdependent." Twining, Llewellyn at 223 (cited in note 83).
142. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 37 Colum L Rev 341,
409 (1937). Llewellyn claimed that "[tiodays' policy and principle will be outdated, within a
generation. But guidance it gives when, and as long as, it fits the facts. And surely the lesson
remains that policy and principle must fit the facts, and must be rebuilt to fit the changing
facts." Llewellyn, 37 Colum L Rev at 409 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
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of this concept is, therefore, no real conflict, since each interpreta-
tion involves the appreciation of commercial mores and practices.
Thus, at its core, situation-sense involves commercial reality.
More importantly, however, situation-sense, when defined as an
understanding and appreciation of commercial practices, makes
sense in light of the Goldschmidt quotation and Llewellyn's
thoughts on the subject. This definition of situation-sense is clearly
derivable from the relevant passages. When Llewellyn speaks of
"'the life conditions of time and place,' "'" this plausibly refers to
the current practices common in the trade. So, to "uncover and to
implement the immanent law"1 5 is to use these commercial facts
as a basis for "fashion[ing] rightly a sound rule""" to control the
disposition of a commercial case. In so doing, a tribunal "truly un-
derstand[s] ' 14 7 or appreciates current commercial mores and
practices.
If situation-sense is defined in this manner (i.e., an understand-
ing and appreciation of the uses and practices common in a trade),
then the second interpretive technique indicates that section 2-
615(a) is predominantly an excuse provision that is commercial in
nature. This is the same interpretation as that reached by analyz-
ing section 2-615 in light of Llewellyn's "patent reason" tech-
nique.14 ' As a result, this fact tends to support the conclusion that
this essay's interpretation of 2-615 is an accurate reflection of the
drafter's purpose.
The Purpose of Section 2-615 Defined
The purpose of section 2-615 is relevant because an interpreta-
tion of this law must be made with reference to that purpose, and
the application of this law must effectuate that purpose. This essay
proposes that the purpose of section 2-615 is to excuse perform-
ance whenever that performance has been made commercially un-
reasonable. In this sense, commercial reasonableness is defined, not
in terms of the present or past desires of the individual parties to
the contract, but with reference to the law merchant - the customs,
usages and practices that are common in the trade.14' The reasona-
144. See note 130 and accompanying text.
145. See note 131.
146. Id.
147. See note 132 and accompanying text.
148. See notes 108 to 123 and accompanying text.
149. Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay On
The Jurisprudence Of Our New Commercial Law, 11 Vill L Rev 213, 220 (1966); Professor
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ble commercial agent is the standard, and commercial mores be-
come determinative in dispute resolution. ' "
Determining what exactly are "common" or "reasonable" com-
mercial practices would not be difficult, or uncertain, since this de-
termination would involve an objective standard. The inquiry
would be whether a representative sample of those who practice
within the trade believe that the conduct in question was a reason-
able commercial standard. If the majority of the sample answers
this question in the affirmative, then the conduct in question
should be deemed a reasonable commercial standard.151 Of course,
if the majority answers in the negative, then the practice will not
be considered commercially reasonable.152 The answer to these
types of questions would be obtained from either expert testimony
or empirical studies.183
An illustration will help make this point clear. In Asphalt Inter-
national, Inc. v Enterprise Shipping Corp.,'" the court addressed
the issue "whether the owner of a vessel rammed amidships may
treat the vessel as a total loss and be excused from further liability
pursuant to the . . . agreement, where the cost of repair exceeds
the vessel's pre-collision fair market value.. . ."55 Under the con-
tract, the owner had the obligation to repair the vessel, but "the
contract stated that '[sihould the vessel be lost, hire shall cease at
Mooney seems to recognize this issue. He said that "[clommercial law in this country is or
soon will be the Uniform Commercial Code and thus is firmly rooted in the rich soil of the
'life-situation' of business agreements made in the context of the contemporary processes of
the primary commercial activity in this country." Mooney, 11 Vill L Rev at 220.
150. Several cases have implicitly recognized this point. Asphalt International, Inc. v
Enterprise Shipping Corp., 667 F2d 261, 265 (1981) ("Custom and Trade in the industry
also provides a basis for allocating risk of loss."); Transatlantica Financing Corp. v United
States, 363 F2d 312, 315 (1966).
151. Obviously, the test could be changed to require two-thirds, or any other suitable
fraction, of a representative sample vote in the affirmative for a practice to be recognized as
common in a trade.
152. This method is premised on the proposition that "[tihe Code is a commercial act
drawn against a competitive market situation where the grosser abuses tend to be self-de-
feating and where self-interest tends to produce standards of behavior which are within the
tolerances of decency." Mentschikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 171 (cited in note 79). Thus, the fear
that a purely analytical standard, as opposed to a normative one, would not promote social
productivity and virtuous behavior is weakened.
153. Of course, an empirical study would have to satisfy some minimum type of re-
quirements so as to insure quality and comprehensiveness of research. For example, a re-
quirement may be that empirical studies must be based on a sample comprised of a requi-
site number of commercial agents.
154. 667 F2d 261 (2nd Cir 1981).
155. Asphalt, 667 F2d at 263.
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noon on the day of her loss.. .. ' "" Although the ship could be
repaired in this case, the court concluded that the vessel had been
lost. In light of the mandates of business sense then, when the ves-
sel was deemed a constructive total loss, the' owner's duty to repair
its vessel was discharged. This custom dictates "that when a ship-
owner is insured and the cost of repairs . ..exceed the repair
value of the ship, the owner may 'abandon' the vessel to the in-
surer as if it were a total loss."' 67 Since the vessel had been lost,
the owner's contractual obligations were discharged. What is im-
portant in this case is that the court used maritime custom to set-
tle the case. ' "
Establishing a line of demarcation between different trades
would not be difficult. The dictionary defines trade as, among
other things, " [a] line of work. . . pursued as a business or calling,
as for a livelihood or profit;. . . anything practiced as a means of
getting a living, . . . or the buying and selling, or exchanging, of
commodities, either by wholesale or retail within a country or be-
tween countries."15' Using this definition as a guide, judges must
utilize "their intuition and life experiences ' " to ascertain the di-
vision between various trade groups. Application of this definition
is not likely to be difficult.
One could argue that distinguishing between different types of
trade will be more difficult than this essay seems to propose. But
that point is debatable. In the vast majority of cases it will not be
difficult to distinguish one trade from another. For example, it is
common knowledge that a plumber occupies a different trade than
a carpenter. In more difficult cases, the court could define a trade
with reference to the majority view of a representative sample of
commercial agents who are suspected members of that trade. Of
course, in some cases delineating a trade will be difficult and yield
a murky answer. But complex and indefinite issues are not new in
the law nor is a court unfamiliar with this task. In the final analy-
sis, a court must simply do its best in deciding the difficult cases
and hope that these cases are few and far between.
In an effort to create as much certainty as possible in the appli-
156. Id.
157. Id at 265.
158. It should also be noted that the owner in this case was claiming impracticability
of performance by virtue of the cost of the repair.
159. Black's Law Dictionary 1338 (West, 5th ed 1979).
160. Note, Rumplestiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers,
99 Harv L Rev 1936, 1954 (1986).
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cation of this new standard, this essay proposes that performance
should be discharged, in whole or in part, whenever the essential
nature of the contract is commercially recognized as having been
significantly altered. This proposition finds support in the com-
ments to section 2-615. Comment 4 alludes to this conclusion when
it states that a "contingency which alters the essential nature of
performance" will bring a contract within the ambit of section 2-
615. Further, at least one court has implicitly recognized this test.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v McDonnell Douglas Corp.1 ' that "[t]he rational for the doc-
trine of impracticability is that the circumstance causing the
breach has made performance so vitally different from what was
anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably thought to
govern.
' 1 62
Empirical study concerning the attitude of business people to-
ward commercial agreements also indicates that "[a]lthough the
parties [may] fail to cover all foreseeable contingencies, they will
exercise care to see that both understand the primary obligation on
each side.1' 16' This finding infers that the primary obligation of the
contracting parties, that is the essential nature of the contract, is
the item which is most relevant to the parties. Consequently, when
the primary obligation or essential nature of the contract is al-
tered, a colorable argument exists that the contract does not effec-
tuate the intention of the parties. This is a good reason why the
terms of the original contract should no longer be binding. In any
event, this proposal does have a basis in the Code, case law, and
commercial reality.
Redrafting of Section 2-615(a)
Section 2-615(a) ought to be altered to implement the above
ideas. The redrafted statute should be susceptible to an interpreta-
tion which more adequately reflects the intent of the original draft-
ers. The practical consequence of this proposal would be that a
court's application of section 2-615(a) would be consistent with
Llewellyn's commercial philosophy. Further, such a reformulation
would effectuate the presumable expectation of the parties and
161. 532 F2d 957 (5th Cir 1976).
162. Eastern Air Lines, 532 F2d at 991 (citing S. Willston, Contracts §1963 at 5511
(1938)).
163. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rlations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 Am Soc Rev 55, 62 (1963).
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create certainty in business transactions, as well as promote effi-
ciency in commercial contracts. Consider the merits of this
possibility:
IF
(1)(A) Performance, by a party to a contract, has been made more
difficult by the happening of an unexpected"' event;
OR 165
(1)(B) Performance, by a party to a contract, has been made more
costly by the happening of an unexpected event;
AND
IF, AND ONLY IF,
(2)(A) The event, alleged to have made performance more difficult,
was deemed unexpected according to customs, usages and practices
in the trade;
AND
(2)(B) The customs, usages and practices common in the trade in-
dicate that the essential nature of the contract has been changed
by virtue of the happening of the unexpected event;
THEN
(3)Delay or nonperformance, in whole or in part, is not a breach of
contract.
As far as possible, the proposed reformulation attempts to use
simple language in order to make the meaning of the text plain. In
this sense, "plain meaning" refers to words whose meaning is easily
available to the reader.'" Of course, it is a fiction to believe that
any group of words necessarily have only one meaning.167 There-
fore, in interpreting this statute, a court ought to prefer the ordi-
nary and common meaning of the words.'"8 As such, there are no
stipulative definitions in the conditions of the statute and the
words of the statute should be given their ordinary meaning.""
164. Mentachikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 172 (cited in note 79). Professor Mentschikoff, in
discussing the Code provisions on excuse in part six of Article II, said "It]he Code for the
first time deals broadly with the problem of adjustment or cancellation of the contract in
view of the unexpected occurrence." Id. "Unexpected" is used to indicate that just because a
disruptive event was a logical possibility does not necessarily entail that it was expected.
165. "OR" means "[Al or [B]" or "[A] and/or [B]."
166. See Stephen M. Ross, On Legalities And Linguistics: Plain Language Legisla-
tion, 30 Buffalo L Rev 317, 331 (1981): "Plain language legislation ultimately seeks to insure
that the meaning of a written agreement will be easily available to both parties."
167. Ross, 30 Buffalo L Rev at 332 (cited in note 166).
168. Id (author cites 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 247 (1964) as authority for this
proposition).
169. But, see notes 173 to 178 and accompanying text. Although the conditions of the
statute contain no stipulative definitions, this essay does stipulate definitions for the syntax
1991
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The new statute was written by using normalized drafting.'"
Normalized drafting "may be described in a general way as a con-
sistent combination of a limited set of standard legal syntax terms
with traditional typographic techniques such as capitalization, out-
line labeling with letters and numbers, and indentation of text.'
7 1
The benefit of this kind of drafting is, among other things, that




In normalized drafting, capitalized syntax terms have special
meanings. 1 7  Some syntax terms introduce statements of condi-
tions. For example, "IF" indicates that the following condition(s)
are necessary to produce the stated result(s) if not qualified by
some preceding or immediately following syntax term.1 7 That is,
the operation of "IF" conditions are subject to other syntax terms.
Thus, in the reformulation conditions (1)(A) and (1)(B) are poten-
tially necessary conditions of the statute. The syntax term "IF,
AND ONLY IF" is used to denote necessary condition(s) to pro-
duce the stated legal result(s). 7' Conditions (2)(A) and (2)(B) in
the reformulation are, thus, necessary conditions for relief to be
granted.
Other syntax terms connect propositions expressing conditions.
"OR" connects conditions which are alternatives for reaching the
stated results. 1 6 Consequently, in the redrafted statute either
(1)(A) or (1)(B) must be obtained before relief can be granted. All
conditions which are connected by "AND" must be satisfied to
produce the stated legal result.1 77 Therefore, conditions (1)(A) or
(1)(B), and (2)(A) and (2)(B) must occur for their to be contractual
discharge. Finally, "THEN" is used to introduce statement(s) of
terms used in the reformulation.
170. See Fred B. Gray, Reducing Unintended Ambiguity in Statutes: An Introduc-
tion to Normalization of Statutory Drafting, 54 Tenn L Rev 433 (1987). Professor Gray
argues that "[nlormalization clarifies structural or syntactic relationships between and
among propositions stating factual or legal conditions . .. and propositions stating legal
consequences." Gray, 54 Tenn L Rev at 434. See also, Layman E. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A
Razor Edge Tool For Drafting And Interpretating Legal Documents, 66 Yale L J 833
(1957); Layman E. Allen & C. Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting And The Query
Model, 29 J Legal Educ 380 (1978).
171. Gray, 54 Tenn L Rev at 435-36 (cited in note 170).
172. Id at 434-35.
173. Professor Gray defines "syntax" as referring "to structural relationships between
and among grammatically complete propositions." Gray, 54 Tenn L Rev at 434.
174. Id at 437.
175. Id.
176. Id at 438.
177. Id.
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legal result(s). This syntax term means that the statements which
follow it are "the legal results of fulfilling the preceding condi-
tions. 178 In the reformulated statute, "THEN" introduces the ex-
cuse from performance.
THE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN KARL LLEWELLYN'S COMMERCIAL
PHILOSOPHY AND THE NEW STATUTE
Karl Llewellyn's Commercial Philosophy
The new standard seems to comport with Llewellyn's commer-
cial philosophy. Llewellyn believed that the principle source of
commercial law was the reality it sought to govern. 179 This was
because
it is not safe to reason about business cases from cases in which an uncle
became interested in having his nephew see Europe, go to Yale, abstain
from nicotine, or christen his infant heir 'Alvardus Torrington II'. And it
may be even urged that safe conclusions as to business cases of the more
ordinary variety cannot be derived from what courts or scholars rule about
the idiosyncratic desires of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased
flag-pole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn Bridge.'"
Yet, Llewellyn recognized that much of legal doctrine was incon-
sistent with commercial reality." 1 For example, he contrasted the
way in which the law viewed obligation with the way commercial
agents viewed obligation, and found that the two were not the
same.18' One aspect of this difference is "the difference in content
between the running, flexible obligation understood in fact by the
parties and the rigid, stereotyped obligation which the law will rec-
ognize. '"' In explanation, Llewellyn elaborated that, where as le-
178. Id at 438.
179. In Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary at 362 (cited in note 93), Professor Gedid said, "Llewel-
lyn . . .believed that business thinking, custom and practice were inherently one of the
principle sources of commercial law." In Mooney, 11 Vill L Rev at 218 (cited in note 149),
Professor Mooney stated that Llewellyn "emphasized that business arrangements.. .are a
more reasonable foundation upon which theories of contract should be based." In Danzig, 27
Stan L Rev at 624 (cited in note 139), Professor Danzig stated, "Llewellyn saw law as an
articulation and regularization of unconsciously evolved mores - as a crystallization of a
generally recognized and almost indisputable right rule (a "singing reason"), inherent in, but
very possibly obscured by, existing patterns of relationships." (Footnote omitted.)
180. Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II, 48 Yale
L J 779, 785 (1939).
181. Gedid, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev at 361 (cited in note 93).
182. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L J
704, 712-13, 722-23, n.45 (1931). Llewellyn commented that "legal obligation comes ... to
diverge from non-legal obligation." Llewellyn, 40 Yale L J at 712.
183. Id at 712-13.
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gal obligation calls for "some single definite manner and quality of
performance," non-legal obligation encompasses "a range within
which one party or the other or both can demand an alteration of
terms, which will shift the whole belt of performance; this may run
to delay, to shift in quantity or quality, even to outright
cancellation." ' "
This dichotomy concerned Llewellyn. He believed that the law
must be changed if it was to realistically govern and reflect busi-
ness life.180 In such a change, Llewellyn argued that legal doctrine
must "include great blocks of what we know as property, and eq-
uity, and remedies, to cover as well the most significant parts of
business associations, and who knows what besides."'" Further, if
this change were not implemented, the law would remain chaotic
and futile.1 81
The Relationship Between The New Statute and Llewellyn's
Philosophy
The new standard is compatible with Karl Llewellyn's commer-
cial philosophy. Since the reformulated version is based on com-
mercial facts, it skirts many of the problems identified by Llewel-
lyn. Further, the new standard attempts to incorporate the
business understanding of commercial obligation. This is accom-
plished by making excuse for delay or nonperformance, in whole or
in part, dependent on commercial mores and practices. That is, le-
gal obligation now reflects commercial practices. The implication
of these conclusions is that Llewellyn would be sympathetic to the
reformulated version of section 2-615(a). This probability is impor-
tant because, inasmuch as the new standard drastically alters
Llewellyn's version of the impracticability statute, it demonstrates
that the new standard reflects the drafter's ideas on commercial
law. Thus, the new standard is not susceptible to the criticism that
it diverges from the intent of the drafter.
184. Id at 723, n.45.
185. Id at 751. Llewellyn advocated that "[olverwhelming is the certainty that any
synthesis which is to match with the meaning of the law in life must expand beyond the
futile limits set by present legal theory." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. "Overwhelming in no less measure is the conviction that broad forms of words
are chaos, that only in close study of facts salvation lies." Id.
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RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE NEW IMPRACTICABILITY
STATUTE" 8
Relational and Discrete Transactions
Contemporary contract scholarship has classified exchange into
two rough categories.' 8 ' An exchange may be discrete or it may be
relational in nature.1' 0 A discrete exchange is a transaction which
is relatively free from relations except those created by a common
language, social structure and a monetary system.19' This relation
has "two general characteristics dominat[ing] the transaction: it is
short; it is limited in scope.'"9 In this sense, a discrete exchange
would involve parties with no significant past relations and would
"happen quickly lest the parties should develop some kind of a
relation."'"9
An example will help illuminate this type of transaction. Sup-
pose a person makes a cash purchase of gasoline at a station on a
turnpike. Let us further stipulate that this road is rarely traveled
by the buyer.'" This would be a very discrete exchange. The ex-
change is both short and limited in scope. "A few minutes measure
its duration, and no one, even the most gregarious, enters into any-
thing approaching a total human relationship in such a situa-
188. This essay assumes a rather naive view of commercial reality. That is, the forth-
coming discussions do not consider the effects of a monopoly in the market place, or a less
than ideally competitive market place, or special transactions that involve the interrelation
of relational and discrete exchanges. This essay deals with generalizations. The new theory
does not purport to provide an answer for all transaction types or various degrees of type
transactions. It is sufficient that this theory resolve commercial transactions that occur most
of the time.
189. Of course, this position does not have the unified support of all contemporary
contract scholars. See for example, Charles Fried, Contract As Promise: A Theory of Con-
tractual Obligation (Harvard, 1981). Professor Freid argues that contractual obligation is
derived from the moral force to fulfill one's promises. This force is constant no matter
whether the exchange is deemed "discrete" or "relational."
190. Strictly speaking, an exchange is not merely one or the other type. It may well be
more accurate to say that a transaction may be classified as either predominantly discrete or
predominantly relational. This is because "discrete" and "relational" occupy opposite ends
of a continuum, and it seems contingently true that most contractual obligations may be
located somewhere between the poles. Nonetheless, this essay will argue that most ex-
changes are predominantly relational in character. See notes 210 to 223 and accompanying
text.
191. Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW Univ L Rev 854, 856 (1978):
"A truly discrete exchange transaction would be entirely separate not only from all other
present relations but from all past and future relations."
192. Ian Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S Cal L Rev 691, 720 (1974).
193. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 856 (cited in note 191).
194. Id at 857. Author uses this example.
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tion." 1' 6 Furthermore, there are no past or likely future relations
between the parties; this is indicative of discreteness.'" Generally,
then, a discrete transaction involves an exchange between parties
who have minimal interaction other than the exchange itself.'9
There are several norms associated with discrete transactions.
These norms are to enhance discreteness and to promote "presen-
tiation."9 8 "Presentiation is . . . a recognition that the course of
the future is bound by present events, and that by those events the
future has for many purposes been brought effectively in the pre-
sent." " Contract law promotes presentiation by strictly enforcing
bargains made after mutual assent is given.2 "0 Consequently, when
[A] promises [B] to do [X] at sometime in the future, contract law
not only permits, but enforces [A's] and [B's] decision to presently
determine and control the future. As indicated above,
"[d]iscreteness is the separating of a transaction from all else be-
tween the participants. '"20' Although its ideal may not be reached
in reality, this norm is enhanced by minimizing the contact and
relation between the parties both before and after the contract is
entered.202
A relational transaction is very different from a discrete transac-
tion. It is characterized by an on-going relationship and not a sin-
gle deal.203 As one commentator put it, "[in the 'relational' view
• . .parties treat their contracts more like marriages rather than
like one-night stands."'20 4 Thus, if [A] and [B] enter into a long-
term requirements contract, it is largely a relational agreement
they enter and not one which is largely discrete.
A relational transaction is characterized by two unique transac-
tional norms.205 These are "(1) harmonizing conflict within the in-
ternal social matrix of the relation. . . and (2) preservation of the
195. Macneil, 47 S Cal L Rev at 720-21 (cited in note 192).
196. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 857 (cited in note 191).
197. William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985
Wis L Rev 545, 546 (1985).
198. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 862 (cited in note 191).
199. Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 Va L Rev
589, 595 (1974).
200. Macneil, 60 Va L Rev at 593-94 (cited in note 199).
201. Ian Macneil, The New Social Contract: A Inquiry into Modern Contractual Re-
lations 60 (Yale, 1980).
202. Id.
203. Whitford, 1985 Wis L Rev at 546 (cited in note 197).
204. Robert W. Gordon, McCaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis L Rev 565, 569 (1985).
205. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 862 (cited in note 191).
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relation."'" These norms may entail, among other things, the an-
ticipation of future cooperation by the contracting parties in light
of a disruptive event, and the realization of the limited bindingness
of the contractual relation.0
The New Impracticability Statute's Effect on Discrete
Transactions
The new impracticability statute does not significantly promote
the norms associated with discrete transactions. These norms
would require that change in contractual performance be mini-
mized.2 0 8 Yet, the application of the reformulated statute may re-
quire significant change in contractual obligations ex post.2 "
This criticism of the redrafted statute may be less weighty than
it initially appears. If relatively few discrete transactions will be
involved in the application of the impracticability doctrine, then
concern with whether the statute enhances or detracts from the
vivacity of discrete norms will largely be irrelevant. It will largely
be irrelevant because few discrete norms will be involved in the
impracticability context if the vast majority of exchanges sought to
be brought within the impracticability rubric are relational.
The Relative Number of Discrete Exchanges to be Brought within
the Impracticability Doctrine
Very few economic exchanges involve a predominantly discrete
transactional pattern.2 10 This is largely because discrete exchange
"can play only a very limited and specialized function in any econ-
omy, no matter how market-oriented that economy may be.'
11
The function of a discrete exchange in the economy is the transfer
of control of capital and labor between quasi-independent enti-
ties.2 1 2 But this function alone cannot account for the production,
206. Id at 862, n.24.
207. Macneil, 60 Va L Rev at 595 (cited in note 199).
208. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 859 (cited in note 191). "Within itself, a discrete
transaction is rigid, there being no intention to achieve internal flexibility." Id.
209. Arguably, the statute does not enhance or detract from the discrete norm to en-
hance discreteness. In any event, the new statute definitely contravenes the discrete norm to
promote "presentiation." This is because relief under the statute will alter contractual
obligations.
210. Ian Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis L
Rev 483, 487 (1985), wherein the author posits that "discrete exchanges are always relatively
rare compared to patterns of relational exchange." (Footnote omitted.)
211. Macneil, 1985 Wis L Rev at 485 (cited in note 210).
212. Id. Of course, "[that transfer of control of goods and services is one economic
1991
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distribution and consumption of goods and services. 1 These
processes can only occur in one of two ways. Either "one person
applies his hands and mind over time to available tools and mater-
ials to change them to more economically useful forms, or . . . a
number of people working together do the same. 11 4 In neither sit-
uation is discrete exchange implicated. The first case does not in-
volve an exchange at all."' Thus, discrete exchange cannot be
found in that phase. The second case does involve an exchange,
but it is relational instead of discrete."' Consequently, discrete ex-
change is not itself physically productive, and thus, plays only a
limited role in the economy.
In the sale of goods likely to fall under Article 2, the occurrence
of discrete exchanges will be rare relative to relational exchanges.
This is because discrete exchanges perform only the transfer-of-
control function in the economy, and are thus only minimally re-
lated to the production of goods and services. That is, there are
two ways by which resources can gain value: (1) the resources' con-
version into goods and services (i.e., physical production) and (2)
the transfer of these goods and services to people who value them
more than the transferor (i.e., transfer of control)." 7 Both these
processes must occur for resources to obtain their maximum
value." The point is that discrete exchanges do not contribute
very much to the actualization of step one."' Since relational
transactions can perform the transfer-of-control function, and are
more closely related to the production of goods and services than
discrete exchanges, it may be inferred that relational exchanges are




There is a more specific reason why discrete transactions are un-
likely to be involved in the impracticability context. Rarely will
there exist within a discrete transaction a conflict between contrac-
tual obligation and changed circumstances."' There are two rea-
function essential to production." Id (footnote omitted).
213. Macneil, 1985 Wis L Rev at 485-86 (cited in note 210).
214. Id at 486.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id at 487.
218. Id.
219. See notes 210 to 216 and accompanying text.
220. Macneil, 1985 Wis L Rev at 488 (cited in note 210).
221. Macneil, 72 NW Univ L Rev at 860 (cited in note 191). "Only rarely in a discrete
transaction will the items contracted for become useless before the forward contract is per-
formed or become of such lessened value that ihe buyer either will not want them or will
want them in a greatly changed form." Id.
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sons why this is true. First, discrete transactions occur quickly.
There is simply not enough time within a discrete relation for a
conflict to arise. Suppose, for example, that [A] goes to a fast-food
restaurant to order a meal. This is a very discrete transaction. Af-
ter ordering, [A] immediately tenders cash payment, and [A]
promptly receives his food in return. The transaction is likely to be
completed before a disruptive event occurs. Now, if [A] did not
perform immediately, that is, if there was any sort of temporal de-
lay between entering an agreement and performance of contractual
obligations, then that contractual relationship is not so discrete,
but is more relational.
The second reason why discrete transactions are unlikely to be
the focus of an impracticability inquiry is that they tend to be lim-
ited in scope. A discrete exchange envisions a single transaction.
Intuitively, the probability of a conflict arising which adversely af-
fects contractual performance is directly proportional to the num-
ber of obligations in the contract. A greater number of obligations
increases the opportunity for a conflict to materialize. For example,
a disruptive event is more likely to arise in a long-term supply con-
tract which envisions many contractual obligations than in a single
sale of a chattel. Since discrete transactions involve only one ex-
change, they are relatively less likely to be the object of conflict.
The implication of the foregoing discussion is that the vast ma-
jority of contractual exchanges sought to be brought within the im-
practicability doctrinp will be relational in character. Thus, con-
cern with whether the new statute effectuates discrete norms is
largely irrelevant. If this is true, then the new impracticability
statute must show adequate deference to the relational norms.23
But are these relational norms valid? Arguably, a statute should
strive to enhance these norms if, and only if, they are an accurate
reflection of reality. To the extent these contractual norms have no
empirical basis, then to that same extent will the argument in
favor of a statute purporting to promote these norms be weakened.
Of course, the converse of this is true. Mainly, if the relational
norms are founded in real experience, and if the new statute pro-
222. Macneil, 60 Va L Rev at 596, n.22 (cited in note 199). "Moreover, no exchange
projected into the future by a promise can ever occur in the absence of at least some rela-
tional framework, since some basis for expecting the promises to be performed must exist."
Id.
223. This proposition assumes that statutes affecting contracts ought to effectuate the
predominant contractual norms. This seems true. In any event, this essay proceeds on the
assumption that this proposition is true.
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motes these norms, then this is a good reason to accept the re-
drafted statute. The issues then become whether the relational
norms accurately reflect commercial reality and, if so, whether the
redrafted version promotes these norms.
Empirical Evidence of Commercial Practices and Relational Con-
tract Norms
The relational norms do appear to have empirical support. One
of the central themes of research in this area is that contracting
parties do not diligently plan their relationship in light of legal re-
quirements and the chance of nonperformance.2"4 From a commer-
cial perspective, it is not too important that a contractual agree-
ment may not be legally binding." 5 Business people are not
interested at what point in time their contract with another is
formed .22 For example, one commentator found that
"[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on 'a man's word'. . ., a hand-
shake, or 'common honesty and decency' - even when the transac-
tion involves exposure to serious risk,""s3 7 rather than a legally en-
forceable contract. This attitude exists because the belief among
many commercial agents is that the contract creates a type of part-
nership for a specific purpose ." This belief is intensified by the
fact that most commercial contracts are not discrete transactions,
but involve more lengthy commitments."'
Further, the parties' contractual obligations tend to be vague .23
Often performance is left indefinite purposely. This is because mi-
nor details are expected to be worked out between the parties at a
later date.' In addition, contracting parties may tacitly expect
224. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis L Rev 465, 467
(1985). The assumption that parties plan their contracts in light of legal requirements is
"just wrong or so greatly overstated as to be seriously misleading." Id.
225. Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past, Present and Future, 1967 Wis L Rev 805, 814 (1967). "In most kinds of
transactions, businessmen are very unlikely to worry about whether the contract that they
are negotiating is cast in proper form to make it legally enforceable." Id.
226. Friedman, 1967 Wis L Rev at 814 (cited in note 225). In fact, "they are very likely
to start performing before all the necessary contract 'formalities' are complied with." Id.
227. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 58 (cited in note 163).
228. Friedman, 1967 Wis L Rev at 816 (cited in note 225).
229. Id. Authors comment that "there are relatively few one-shot. . . deals." Id.
230. Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of
Contract, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev 507, 508 (1977).
231. Friedman, 1967 Wis L Rev at 814 (cited in note 225); Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev
at 64 (cited in note 163). "Businessmen may welcome a measure of vagueness in the obliga-
tions they assume so that they may negotiate matters in light of the actual circumstances."
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that industry norms will flesh out their express agreement."" In
fact, it appears that the only necessary condition for the existence
of a commercial agreement is that both parties understand their
primary obligation." The vagueness and flexibility of real com-
mercial agreements is reflected in the belief of many business peo-
ple that "they have the right to cancel a contract before significant,
tangible reliance has occurred.'2"
If a conflict arises within the life of a contract, it is rarely settled
by adjudicating the matter in a legal forum.23 6 The reason for this
is that there are many non-judicial means of dispute resolution.aM
First, business culture may indicate what the parties should do
when a conflict arises."7 For example, there is a business norm
that one should not welsch on a deal unless absolutely necessary.ss
Or, parties will often simply "work things out" when a conflict ma-
terializes. 39 "One important businessman said ... if something
comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with
the problem."" 0 This attitude stems from the desire to continue
successfully in business .' This goal is promoted if business people
remain relatively flexible to the needs of their co-contractors. Oth-
erwise, one's business will not get repeat customers and the busi-
ness' general reputation will suffer."'
Empirical data suggests that the contracting parties have an ex-
pectation that commercial practices are more important in the for-
mation of an agreement than contract law. For example, the pres-
ence of offer, acceptance and consideration does not necessarily
determine when a commercial agreement exists, but a businessper-
son's handshake will achieve this end. In addition, the data indi-
cates that contractual obligations are to be refined as a commercial
Id.
232. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 63 (cited in note 163).
233. Id at 62. "Although the parties fail to cover all foreseeable contingencies, they
will exercise care to see that both understand the primary obligation on each side." Id.
234. Friedman, 1967 Wis L Rev at 814 (cited in note 225).
235. Macaulay, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev at 509 (cited in note 230).
236. Id at 510.
237. Macaulay, 1985 Wis L Rev at 467 (cited in note 224). "There are business cul-
tures defining ... what should be done when things go wrong." Id.
238. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 63 (cited in note 163).
239. Friedman, 1967 Wis L Rev at 815 (cited in note 225).
240. Id.
241. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 63 (cited in note 163). "Both business units involved
in the exchange desire to continue successfully in business and will avoid conduct which




contract matures. Furthermore, if a conflict arises, it is usually set-
tied within the confines of the relationship itself. These general
conclusions tend to support the relational norms.
Business people tend to act in conformity with the relational
norms; they tend to resolve disputes within the context of the rela-
tion and act in such a way that promotes the existence of the rela-
tion. For example, the adequacy of "loose" contractual require-
ments (for example, a business agreement based on another's word
and not the formal legal requirements) will promote the relation-
ship, by not requiring many procedural hurdles to be overcome in
the creation of the agreement. Fewer requirements result in a
greater likelihood that a relationship will spring into existence and,
once in existence, will flourish. This is because there is relatively
less of an opportunity for an agreement to miss having a necessary
element when it has few requirements. These probabilities are en-
hanced by the existence of a common goal between the parties.
Furthermore, a relatively flexible contractual obligation allows the
parties to adjust performance in light of events which arise ex
ante. This tends to preserve the contractual relationship. If ade-
quate contractual performance is composed of fewer requirements,
then the likelihood that the contract will be performed and not
breached is increased. Finally, the finding that most conflicts aris-
ing within the life of a commercial contract are settled within the
confines of the relation needs no explanation, since this is one of
the relational norms.
The New Impracticability Statute's Effect on Relational Norms
The proposed redrafted version of section 2-615(a) effectuates
the relational norms. This is largely accomplished by basing the
operation of the new statute on current commercial mores and
practices. This statute promotes the harmonizing of conflict within
the contractual relation by promulgating, before litigation is initi-
ated, that the statute will view commercial practices as determina-
tive. This creates an incentive for contracting parties to resolve a
conflict by not resorting to litigation. Since application of this stat-
ute will merely enforce what the parties should do themselves,""
243. In effect, a resort to litigation forces the parties to do that which ideally they
ought to do, which is to use current commercial practices to guide their conduct. Since a
majority of commercial agents adhere to current commercial norms, a colorable claim exists
that all business people should act in this way. Uniformity in commercial practice would




they will avoid the cost of litigation by acting in a way that ad-
heres to current commercial practices. If the contracting parties
act in a way that conforms to these practices, then they will likely
resolve disputes within the confines of the relation.""
Note that by effectuating the first relational norm, the second
norm is also promoted. That is, by enhancing the harmonizing of
conflict within the bounds of the relation, the second norm, the
preservation of the relationship, is also promoted. This is because
the degree or preservation of the relationship is directly propor-
tional to the amount of harmonizing of conflict that arises within
the relation. The fewer conflicts that go unresolved, the more likely
it is that the relationship will be preserved."
45
In any event, the new impracticability statute tends to enhance
the second relational norm directly as well. One way the statute
accomplishes this end is to allow performance to be discharged in
part. Partial discharge leaves the contractual relation intact. It
only modifies one (or both) party's contractual obligation. If the
relationship is left intact, it then has the potential to prosper.
Further, since relief pursuant to the new statute is premised on
current commercial mores, it is likely that the party seeking to en-
force the co-contractor's obligation will be more receptive to a
judgment discharging, in whole or in part, his co-contractor's con-
tractual obligations. This is because the current commercial prac-
tices embody how commercial agents ought to act."' These prac-
tices are normative in the sense that the business community
expects its members to comply with current business practices. 4
7
This normative quality of commercial norms will go a long way in
making the judgment acceptable to the advantaged party.
There are other reasons why the new statute would facilitate the
advantaged party's 48 acceptance of an adverse decision. First, the
244. See note 235 and accompanying text.
245. This, of course, assumes that conflict is the main ingredient for the destruction of
a relationship.
246. Mentschikoff, 27 Mod L Rev at 171 (cited in note 79). In "a competitive market
situation . . . the grosser abuses tend to be self-defeating." Id. Thus, a commercial agent
has an incentive to act within the bounds of reasonableness. See also, note 152.
247. Thus, when a court holds, for example, that [A's] delayed performance is excused
pursuant to the new impracticability statute, it is saying to [B], [A's] co-contractor, "You
ought to have excused delayed performance without litigating the matter since this result
would be required by current commercial mores."
248. In this paper, the "disadvantaged" party is one whose cost of performance has
increased by virtue of the occurrence of the disruptive event. The "advantaged party" is the
one who gains from the happening of the disruptive event. That is, it is the party who gains
from the disadvantaged party's unaltered contractual performance which is "cheap" in light
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judgment, in a sense, would be self-imposed. To the extent the ad-
vantaged party's commercial conduct contributes to current com-
mercial practices, then to that same extent must the advantaged
party condone a judgment resulting from the application of the
new statute. This is because the new statute makes current com-
mercial practices determinative as to whether relief will be
granted. Since the advantaged party's acts help comprise the do-
main of current commercial practices, it is not unrealistic to say
that this party "caused" the outcome of the case. Schematically,
we have:
(advantaged make up (current determine (outcome of
party's actions) commercial practices) litigation)
Thus, it is not entirely inaccurate to say that the advantaged party
willed the court's adverse ruling.
Even if the advantaged party was atypical, that is, his commer-
cial behavior was not in accord with current commercial practices,
a judicial decision based on commercial mores would still be rela-
tively more acceptable than one that was not based on such prac-
tices. This is because the advantaged party will not feel that some
outside third party has dictated an adverse decision which he must
now accept. Quite the contrary, it is the commercial community,
the advantaged party's true peers, which, through current commer-
cial custom, has decided the case adversely to him. Thus, it is not a
police person, but a family member, who has dictated that the ad-
vantaged party must act in a certain way. This recognition will
make an adverse decision more readily acceptable to the ad-
vantaged party.
In addition, an adverse decision will be more readily acceptable
by the advantaged party if he knows that such a decision was not
arbitrarily made, and that this "rule of law" would apply to all
commercial agents similarly situated. A decision derived from the
application of the new statute would not be arbitrary, because the
decision is based on objective criteria - the customs, usages and
practices current in a trade.2' Objective criteria can be applied in
a neutral fashion. Further, the statute indicates how this objective
criteria is to be applied. These are characteristics of non-arbitrari-
ness.'s Also, since the application of the statute is not arbitrary,
of the new event.
249. In this sense, the decision is not arbitrary with respect to the application of the
statute. Arguably, underlying commercial mores may be arbitrary.
250. Arbitrary means, among other things, "Without adequate determining principle
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commercial agents know that all commercial parties similarly situ-
ated will be affected in the same way by the application of the new
statute.
The point is that if an adverse judgment is made easier to accept
by the advantaged party, then the judgment itself will be less
likely to disrupt the contractual relationship. In this way, the rela-
tionship is preserved.
FAIRNESS AND CERTAINTY
The foregoing discussion indicates that the new impracticability
statute is fair. A rule that is not arbitrary and is applied to all
persons similarly situated would seem to embody elements of fair-
ness. The dictionary defines "fair" as, inter alia, "Having the qual-
ities of impartiality and honesty."'' The application of the new
impracticability statute comports with this definition. Since the
application of the statute is not arbitrary, that is, it does not de-
pend on the whim of the judicial tribunal, it is impartial."2 Fur-
ther, because the statute is based on commercial facts, it can be
characterized by "honesty."' 5 It appears, then, that application of
the new statute is fair.
The new impracticability statute allows for certainty in commer-
cial transactions.'" Since the statute is based on objective facts,
the outcome of the application of the statute is easily predictable.
All one must know to anticipate this outcome is the statute itself
and current commercial practices within the trade. A commercial
agent will likely be aware of these practices, and he can easily be-
come familiar with the statute given its plain language drafting.
Thus, a decision derived by the application of the statute can be
very predictable.
When something is predictable, it lends certainty to transactions
that involve, or may involve, that something. For example, if [A]
contracts to sell corn to [B], the fact that the price per bushel or
the quantity of corn involved is absolutely predictable ex ante
(.. or] depending on the will alone." Black's Law Dictionary 96 (West, 5th ed 1979).
251. Black's Law Dictionary 535 (West, 5th ed 1979).
252. See Legal Thesaurus 29, 260 (West, 1980) ("impartial" is synonymous with "de-
tached", "disinterested" and "objective", and these concepts are contrary to being "arbi-
trary" which means "according to desires").
253. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 549 (Merriam-Webster Inc., 1974). Honesty
means "adherence to the facts." Thus, if something adheres to the facts it has elements of
honesty.
254. Williams, 97 Harv L Rev at 1497-498 (cited in note 139).
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tends to promote certainty with respect to that facet of the trans-
action. This is because a conflict between the parties concerning
that aspect of the exchange will not arise ex post.25 5 If, in the ex-
ample, the price of corn increases between the times of contracting
and performance, and both [A] and [B] predicted at the negotia-
tion stage that this would occur, then it is unlikely that a dispute
will arise concerning this aspect of the transaction, since the par-
ties entered the agreement based on the assumption this event
would occur. Consequently, when an aspect of a transaction is pre-
dictable, it tends to promote certainty with respect to that aspect.
Because the outcome of the application of the new statute is pre-
dictable, it creates certainty with respect to that outcome. A deriv-
ative effect of this conclusion is that transactional planning is facil-
itated. If contracting parties can predict ex ante the type of
circumstances which will excuse one (or both) of the party's con-
tractual obligations, then they could take these circumstances into
account and plan their contract accordingly. Therefore, the new
statute facilitates long-term contractual planning.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
Contract Law and Economics
Richard Posner has suggested that economic theory can help ex-
plain and predict contract theory.2' Posner begins with the obser-
vation that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life.' 5 7 As
such, "if a person's surroundings change in such a way that he
could increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do
SO.' 58 Posner believes that three fundamental principles of eco-
nomics may be derived from this conclusion.'"
The "Law of Demand" is the first economic principle . 60 Accord-
ing to this proposition, there exists a inverse relationship between
the price charged and the quantity demanded. 61 In other words, if
255. This assumes that the something that is predictable is absolutely predictable.
This is not always true. Nonetheless, even if something is only very, and not absolutely,
predictable this would still entail that an ex post conflict concerning this something would
be unlikely.
256. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 1.3 at 13 (Little, Brown & Co.,
2d ed 1977).
257. Posner, Economic § 1.1 at 3 (cited in note 256).
258. Id at 4.
259. Id.
260. Id at 5.
261. Id at 4.
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the price of a product increases, then, all things being equal, " ' the
demand for that product will decline." 3
The second principle is the notion of "cost." "Cost to the econo-
mist," Posner says, "is 'opportunity cost' - the benefit forgone by
employing the resources in a way that denies its use to someone
else.""'" "Cost" is the consumption of resources'" incurred in the
making of a product."'
The final economic concept is efficiency. Posner advocates that
"'[e]fficiency' means exploiting resources in such a way that 'value'
- human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willing-
ness to pay for goods and services - is maximized.' " Furthermore,
voluntary transactions, Posner claims, are the only way to obtain
the most efficient use of resources.2" The rational for this latter
proposition is that if efficiency is measured by willingness to pay,
and the only way to ascertain "willingness to pay" is to observe
voluntary transactions, then voluntary transactions are necessary
for determining whether the transaction is efficient or not. Posner
believes that the common law is economic in character."" He
posits that "[tihe common law method is to allocate responsibili-
ties between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way
as to maximize joint value, or what amounts to the same thing,
262. Id at 5. Posner assumes the only change occurring in the system is the change in
relative price and quantity. He assumes away the possible impact of changing incomes.
263. Id. For example, If Peter enjoys eating red apples and the price of these apples
increases from $0.89 per pound to $1.89 per pound, then, assuming Peter is on a fixed in-
come and the price of other food remains relatively stable, Peter will likely purchase fewer
red apples.
264. Posner, Economic at 6 (cited in note 256). Cost is incurred only when someone is
denied use of a resource. This is because if resources were unlimited they would be costless,
that is free (for example air).
265. Id at 7. "Resource" does not merely refer to money, but it refers to all that
money represents.
266. Id at 6. Thus, in an ideal mercantile system, the cost of a product would be the
minimum price at which a merchant would accept the sale of the product. Otherwise, a
merchant who sold the product for less than cost would loose money.
267. Posner, Economic § 1.2 at 10 (cited in note 256). Thus, a sales transaction would
constitute maximum efficiency if the seller was able to obtain the highest price, that is
value, as consideration for the goods.
268. Id at 11. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J Leg Stud 83, 88 (1977): "The pro-
cess by which goods and services are shifted into their most valuable uses is one of voluntary
exchange."
269. Posner, Economics § 8.1 at 179 (cited in note 256). Posner argues that it is futile
for contract law to ignore "the economics of the case. The ruling will not effect future con-
duct; it will be reversed by the parties in their subsequent dealings. But it will impose addi-
tional . . . transaction costs." Id § 4.1 at 69.
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minimize the joint cost of the activities."'2 " In summary, Posner
believes that the common law may be explained by an appeal to
these three principles - especially the economist's efficiency
concept.
Economic Analysis Applied to the Impracticability Statute
This essay posits that the application of the new impracticability
statute yields efficient results. The statute is efficient because cur-
rent commercial practices are efficient. That is, since current com-
mercial mores are efficient, a statute which makes these norms de-
terminative in its application will result in states of affairs that are
efficient. This hypothesis raises two related issues: (1) Are current
commercial practices efficient, and, if that question is answered in
the affirmative, (2) does the efficiency of these norms make results
obtained by application of the new statute efficient?
In determining whether current commercial norms are efficient,
it may be helpful to investigate the reasons behind, or the results
of, these practices, and the means by which these mores came into
existence. At its most basic level, the reason behind current com-
mercial practices, or the result obtained by the following these
norms, is that by acting in a commercially acceptable manner, a
commercial agent acts in the most efficient manner.2 71 A para-
mount reason why a business may follow current commercial prac-
tices is concern over the commercial reputation of the business. 72
This concern may take two forms. "One is concerned with both the
reaction of the other party in a particular exchange and with his
own general business reputation.
'273
Concern with a co-contractors reaction to one's business prac-
tices is based on efficiency. If a co-contractor is unhappy with the
way one conducts his business, then the co-contractor can imple-
ment practices, a type of non-legal sanction, which make the trans-
action less efficient. For example, a buyer may withhold part, or
all, of the payment until the seller performs to the buyer's satisfac-
tion. 74 By withholding the payment, the transaction becomes less
efficient from the seller's perspective since the seller, at a mini-
mum, looses the earning power of a prompt payment. That is, if
270. Id.
271. Of course, efficiency in this sense refers to the long-term efficiency of a business.
272. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 64 (cited in note 163).




this sanction is imposed by the buyer, the transaction will be more
costly to the seller. Similarly, the seller has counterbalancing non-
legal sanctions against the buyer. 75 If the seller implements these
non-legal sanctions, it will make the transaction more inefficient,
that is, more costly, from the buyer's perspective.
Yet, the implementation of non-legal sanctions may largely be
avoided, and thereby increase the efficiency of the transaction, if
both parties conform their conduct to current commercial practices
within the trade. This is because, in the vast majority of cases, a
contracting party's expectation will be that his co-contractor per-
forms his obligations in accordance with the current commercial
practices and norms.' If this expectation is satisfied, then it is
very unlikely that this party will implement these non-legal sanc-
tions. In this way, the transaction is more efficient relative to an
exchange in which the parties did not adhere to current commer-
cial practices, and in which non-legal sanctions were implemented.
A business will strive to act in accordance with current commer-
cial practices because of concern with its general reputation in the
business community. By acting in such a way, a business acts effi-
ciently. A business technique of risk avoidance is to deal with firms
that have good reputations.7 7 Consequently, if a firm has a good
business reputation, then, all things being equal, 7s this firm will
attract more business than a firm with a less worthy reputation.
Further, a firm with more business is more efficient than a firm
with less business. The firm with more business is more efficient
because it has more sales than the other firm. "More sales" indi-
cates a greater willingness on the part of customers to pay for the
firm's goods and services. Thus, a firm in this situation is exploit-
ing its resources in a way that maximizes value more than a firm
that has less sales. In addition, an individual transaction of a firm
with less sales will likely be relatively more costly, as compared
275. Id. "The seller may have obtained a large downpayment from the buyer which he
will want to protect. The seller may have an exclusive process which the buyer needs." Id.
276. This proposition is derived from the very definition of current commercial prac-
tices. People expect to occur that which occurs normally in past, similar situations. For
example, in Ohio people expect the sun to rise every morning since it has risen every other
morning in the past. This is simply inductive reasoning. Now, current commercial practices
are those activities which normally occur in a given state of affairs. Since these practices are
the normal occurrence, people come to expect that they will occur given that state of affairs.
277. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 64 (cited in note 163).
278. This discussion assumes two businesses exactly alike save for their reputations




with the same transaction in a firm with more sales. A firm with
less sales may have to offer price discounts or added services to
induce sales. 7 9 Or, because a firm needs sales, it may have to deal
with difficult buyers that demand more than the average buyer.
These obstacles, in turn, raise the cost of each individual transac-
tion for the firm with less sales. Patently, a certain transaction is
more inefficient than the same transaction (which costs less) en-
gaged in by a different firm. In any event, a firm with a good busi-
ness reputation is more efficient than a firm with a less worthy
business reputation. The point is that a firm's adherence to current
commercial practices may help a firm obtain a good business
reputation.
Evidence exists which indicates that acting in a way inconsistent
with current commercial practices will detract from a firm's busi-
ness reputation. As one author put it, "the way one behaves in a
particular transaction, or a series of transactions, will color his gen-
eral business reputation."'280 Thus, for example, a buyer who fails
to pay his bills acts in a way contrary to current commercial mo-
res.2 8' This buyer runs the risk of "a bad report in credit services
such as Dun and Bradstreet.' 8's8 If this occurs, then the buyer will
obtain a poor business reputation. "Obviously, a poor reputation
does not help a firm make sales and may force it to offer great
price discounts and added services to remain in business.' 82 If,
however, the buyer paid his bills, and thus acted in accordance
with current commercial practices, then these bad results would
not occur. This latter buyer would have a relatively better business
reputation than one who did not act in accord with current com-
mercial practices.'" Consequently, it may reasonably be assumed
that when one acts in accordance with current commercial prac-
tices, one, at the very minimum, does not harm his business repu-
tation and may even enhance this reputation. This is a good reason
for business people to act in accordance with these practices.
There is no evidence to indicate that by acting in conformity
with current business practices a firm's general reputation will not
279. Macaulay, 28 Am Soc Rev at 64 (cited in note 163).
280. Id.
281. Id at 63. In business, "[two norms are widely accepted. (1) Commitments are to
be honored in almost all situations . . ." Id. A buyer who does not pay his bills without a
good excuse is not honoring a primary commitment of the transaction.
282. Macauley, 28 Am Soc Rev at 64 (cited in note 163).
283. Id.
284. This essay assumes that one who does not act in accord with the current commer-
cial practices does less then is minimally required by these practices.
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be enhanced. One would think that if a firm followed these prac-
tices it would obtain a good business reputation. This is because
the firm would gain a reputation of effectuating the expectations of
its co-contractors and always fulfilling its contractual obligations.
If potential co-contractors are the least bit risk-adverse, they will
gladly deal with this type of firm.
At this point, an investigation of the means by which current
commercial practices have evolved is important. This essay pro-
poses that these norms evolved through repetitive and voluntary
actions. What is important in this proposition is the inference that
commercial actors were not forced to accept these practices; rather,
they adopted them voluntarily. Surely, in a free market system a
commercial norm would not continue to exist if it were not volun-
tarily accepted. The point is that since "man is a rational maxi-
mizer of his ends in life'' 8a he will only voluntarily accept those
practices that achieve this function. Inefficient practices do not
tend to maximize people's ends in life. Thus, inefficient practices
would only be adopted involuntarily. The negative implication of
this is that those practices which are voluntarily accepted tend to
be efficient ones. In other words, if current commercial practices
are accepted voluntarily, then this is indicative of their efficiency.
There is no reason to believe that current commercial practices are
not accepted voluntarily.
The next issue to be explored is the causal connection between
the efficiency of current commercial practices and the efficiency of
the new statute. That is, if it is true that acting in accordance with
these commercial practices is efficient and that a statute imple-
ments these norms, then does that suggest that the results ob-
tained pursuant to the application of the statute are efficient? Ar-
guably, the results obtained under the new impracticability statute
are efficient, because the new statute makes current business prac-
tices determinative. It is these mores, and only these mores, which
determine whether relief will be granted. In effect, the results ob-
tained under the statute create the same state of affairs which
would have existed had the parties initially followed current com-
mercial practices without resorting to litigation. If the latter situa-
tion is efficient, then, arguably, the former situation is efficient. It
has been demonstrated that acting in accordance with current
commercial practices is highly efficient.286 Since the application of
285. Posner, Economics § 1.1 at 3 (cited in note 256).
286. See notes 271 to 285 and accompanying text.
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the new statute creates the same state of affairs as if the parties
had followed commercial mores, it is, arguably, efficient." 7
More generally, the new statute is efficient because it reinforces
the supremacy of current commercial mores. It achieves this end
by making current commercial practice determinative as to
whether relief will be granted. This creates an incentive for mem-
bers of the business community to follow these norms.28 If
merchants follow these norms, they will act efficiently.' 8' In this
way, the statute is efficient.
CONCLUSION
The current impracticability doctrine is in a state of disarray. Its
application does not mirror commercial reality and it does not
comport with the intent of those who drafted it. As such, this pa-
per has proposed a new impracticability statute which would rem-
edy these shortcomings. In justification of this new statute, this
article has shown that the proposed revisions reflect the commer-
cial philosophy of Karl Llewellyn-the principle drafter of the cur-
rent impracticability statute. Moreover, this article has suggested
that most agreements coming within the impracticability rubric are
"relational" in nature and that this new statute promotes the
norms of relational agreements. This paper has demonstrated that
the new statute is fair, in that it is both impartial and based on
objective commercial facts. Further, the new statute lends itself to
certainty with respect to commercial planning. Finally, the pro-
posed statute should create efficient states of affairs.
287. Of course, this analysis assumes that an individual does not tarnish his reputation
by initiating litigation. This may be true in many cases, as when, for example, there is a
good faith dispute as to which of several commercial norms apply to a conflict. Or, in the
situation when there is no commercial norm on point, and the case must be settled by anal-
ogy to other business practices.
If, however, filing suit does tarnish the plaintiff's business reputation, then it could be
argued that the statute does not create an efficient state of affairs. But even in this case, it is
the plaintiff who tarnishes his reputation by filing suit and it is this consequence which
creates the inefficiency. The operation of the statute has nothing to do with the plaintiff
loosing esteem in the business community. So, maybe the statute is neutral on the efficiency
question?
288. See note 243 and accompanying text.
289. See notes 271 to 285 and accompanying text.
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